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Foreword 
 
Over the next 25 years the number of people living in Indian cities will increase by about 230 
million, almost doubling in size. Thus, over roughly the next generation, India will need to 
expand its infrastructure services to an incremental population that is about as large as the 
current urban population of the United States. Besides these new demands for infrastructure in 
Indian cities, there is a substantial backlog of demand for services to meet today’s needs—the 
needs of one of the most extensive systems of cities in the world, with an existing urban 
population of about 300 million, 32 agglomerations with a million or more residents, and three of 
the world’s 10 largest cities, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Delhi, all with populations in excess of 12 
million.1  Over 20 percent of people in Indian cities live in slums, and there is no major city in 
India that provides safe water on a continuous basis. If the demands implied by this demographic 
transition were not enough, recently an influential study indicates that urbanization plays an 
important role in generating higher rates of economic growth. A McKinsey Company study2 
identifies urban real estate markets as perhaps the single most important constraint on India’s 
ability to sustain the increased growth in the years since the country’s liberalization program 
took hold. 
 
In response to this significant urban challenge, the Government of India (GOI) has initiated a 
centrally driven urban real estate reform process. GOI has moved to empower and encourage  
local reform initiatives by creating an Urban Reform Initiative Fund (URIF) that rewards States 
pursuing market-friendly real estate reforms. In addition, the Tenth Plan underscores a growing 
recognition of the need to dismantle the extensive controls on urban real estate markets, many of 
which were established during the Emergency of 1975-77, and which have deprived cities of the 
tools to effectively ensure an adequate market-driven supply response to growing urban demand 
for land and services. As this reform proceeds, land and housing markets can rely more fully on 
prices to allocate resources, rather than bureaucratic mandates and the corruption that tends to 
accompany excessive regulation. One of the reforms supported under the URIF program is a 
progressive reduction in the stamp duty on immovable property transfers.   
 
Stamp tax reform is a key to this process because high stamp duty rates (most of the rates in 
Indian states are well above those documented internationally) strongly discourage real estate 
transactions and thus impede the development of efficient and flexible urban real estate markets. 
An appropriately designed reform also has the potential of unlocking the real estate wealth in 
cities, which has typically been a foundation of municipal finance. Nonetheless, since stamp 
duties amount to a significant source of revenues for most State governments, often the third or 
fourth most important source of own tax revenues, finding alternative sources of State revenue is 
crucial to moving the reform process forward.  
 
This paper examines both the distortionary impacts of stamp duties and possibilities for 
alternative revenue sources. A key finding from the paper is that evasion of stamp taxes through 
underdeclaration of property values in transactions has an impact on a number of other revenue 
sources, including the federal capital gains tax. In addition, the linkage of underdeclaration and 
black money further saps the fisc of tax revenues across the board. Simulations indicate that 
                                                 
1The data cited here are from the United Nations’ World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, March 2002.  
2 McKinsey Company Report: The Indian Growth Imperative. 9/10/01 
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reform may well lead to better tax system performance overall, although intergovernmental 
transfers may be necessary to ensure that state revenues do not suffer in the short term. 
Recognizing these linkages offers a promising avenue for reform that will improve both the 
efficiency of the tax system and the functioning of urban real estate markets. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the options for reform of stamp duties on immovable property transfers 
collected by Indian state governments. After briefly reviewing some of the many administrative 
difficulties experienced with the tax, the paper turns to an examination of its economic impacts. 
A review of stamp duties internationally indicates that Indian rates are exceptionally high, at 
rates often above 10 percent. Most countries’ rates are less than 5 percent, including a number of 
low and middle-income developing countries.  With these high rates, we find that while the tax 
has become the third-largest revenue source for many Indian states, it imposes high compliance 
costs on taxpayers, has been subject to a good deal of evasion and fraud, and the distortionary 
impacts appear to be large, reducing the responsiveness of real estate markets in Indian cities by 
discouraging transactions essential to the efficient growth of cities. The paper studies the revenue 
implications of lowering stamp duty rates, which need to be understood if reform is to be viable. 
Evidence indicates that the current high duty rates, coupled with weak tax administration,  lead 
to widespread evasion of the tax through underdeclaration. This underdeclaration of property 
values directly affects collection of other taxes, among them, property taxes and capital gains 
tax. Moreover, it indirectly affects the collection of all taxes through the impact of 
underdeclaration on the circulation of black money. Simulations indicate that revenues lost due 
to a lowering of stamp duty rates closer to international levels are quite likely to be recovered in 
higher collections of other taxes. However, these taxes would at least in part be collected by 
other levels of government. Thus, reform could be made a more viable option through 
appropriately designed intergovernmental transfers. 
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Stamp Duties In Indian States:  A Case for Reform 
James Alm, Patricia Annez, and Arbind Modi3 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The State governments in India impose a variety of stamp duties and registration fees on 
different kinds of transactions and instruments.  In total, according to some estimates, over 65 
different kinds of such charges are imposed by the States.4  These charges effectively amount to 
a tax on the value of a transaction, most commonly on the transfer of movable and immovable 
properties and of instruments used in commercial and business transactions.  In their entirety, 
stamp duties and registration fees amount to a significant source of revenues for most of the State 
governments, often the third or fourth most important source of own tax revenues.  For example, 
according to 2002-2003 budget estimates from the Reserve Bank of India (2003), stamp duties 
and registration fees are estimated to generate for all States Rs. 132,588 million in revenues, or 
6.2 percent of total tax revenue of all States, behind only State sales taxes (43.3 percent) and 
State excise duties (9.4 percent) in relative importance.5  Because of their size, stamp duties and 
registration fees are also likely to have a number of effects on the ways in which the States’ 
economies function, some positive but many negative.  Stamp duties have become the subject of 
particular policy interest since the Urban Reform Incentive Fund (URIF) identified the reduction 
of stamp duties as a major element in the reform program to be undertaken by States, because of 
their distorting effects on real estate transactions. 
 
 This paper considers some of the economic and fiscal questions for policy makers 
considering reforms in stamp duties, especially stamp tax reductions.6  In particular, we examine 
stamp duties and registration fees, referred to for simplicity as “stamp duties”.  The 
administration of the stamp duties will be briefly examined, but our main focus will be on two 
other issues.  First, how distorting are the stamp duties in their effects on resource allocation?  
Second, what would be the effects, especially the revenue effects, of previously suggested 
reforms in stamp duties that lead generally to lower tax rates?  In this analysis, the ways in which 
                                                 
3. Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University; World Bank; and  
Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs, Government of India, respectively.  The authors are grateful to a number 
of individuals with whom they met for many helpful discussions and much useful information: Mr. Govinda Rao, 
Mr. Om Prakash Mathur, and Mr. Tapas Sen, the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy; Mr. P.S.S. 
Thomas, Planning Commission; Mr. Vinor Tewari, the National Institute of Urban Affairs; Ms. Renuka 
Viswanathan, Tariff Commission; Dr. Vijay Kelkar, Advisor to the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs; Mr. 
N. John Kurian Planning Commission; Mr. G.C. Srivastava, Finance Commission.  Ms. Kathryn Owens and Mr. 
Jerry Kalarickal at the World Bank provided valuable research assistance for this paper. The authors are grateful to 
Mr. K. G. Krishnamurthy of the Housing Development Finance Corporation for providing data on market values of 
real estate in selected Indian cities. 
4  See the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act (New Delhi, 
India). 
5  See Reserve Bank of India (2003), State Finances – A Study of Budgets 2002-03 (New Delhi, India). 
6 A number of states have already taken action to lower stamp duties or have maintained them at the levels 
envisaged under URIF, among them Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab, and West Bengal. 
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stamp duties are “linked” to other taxes in the Indian public finance system are especially 
important. 
 
 The next section discusses the basic features of stamp duties, including some problems 
that arise in the administration of the stamp duties and some comparisons with international 
practice.  This discussion is necessarily brief given the extensive coverage of administrative 
issues elsewhere.  The economic effects of stamp duties are then examined in the next sections.  
Here the focus is on the distortions generated by the existing level of stamp duties and the likely 
effects on collections of various stamp duty reforms.  The final section summarizes our 
conclusions and relates them to international experience in the imposition of taxes on similar 
types of transactions, especially to recent reforms around the world. 
 
 It should be emphasized at the start that any analysis of stamp duties is made challenging 
by the lack of much quantitative information on such important aspects as the components of 
stamp duty revenues, the types of individuals and transactions who pay the duties, even the ways 
in which the stamp duty tax rates have changed over time.  As a result, much of the analysis 
should be taken as qualitative and suggestive of the general direction of the effects of the duties. 
 
 
II. The Administration of Stamp Duties in India7 
 
A. The Basic Features of Stamp Duties 
 
Stamp duties are imposed under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as amended several times 
over the years at the central government level.  Under these central acts, each State has the 
authority to enact its own stamp duties, so that the specific features of the stamp duties, while 
broadly similar across the States, also take on State specific characteristics. 
 
There are two basic types of charges, stamp duties and registration fees.  A “stamp duty” 
is a tax on the value of instruments used in various business transactions.  Within this broad 
definition of stamp duties, there are two sub-classifications: “judicial stamp duties” and “non-
judicial stamp duties”.  Judicial stamp duties are fees collected from litigants in courts, and are 
best viewed as court fees.  For most States, judicial stamp duties are relatively small in 
magnitude, although there are some exceptions.  Non-judicial stamp duties are typically a one-
time charge on the transfer of immovable property; because the charge is a one-time payment 
whose tax base is the value of the transaction, it can appropriately be seen as a tax on the 
transaction.   The focus of this paper is on these non-judicial stamp duties, which will be referred 
to for convenience as “stamp duties”.  In contrast, a “registration fee” is a payment made for a 
specific service provided by government in recording contracts and deeds, and so is more closely 
related to a user charge.  The government maintains a registry of deeds in return for a fee.  
However, the payment of the registration fee does not entitle the payee to a guaranteed legal 
                                                 
7  For especially detailed discussions of the administration of stamp duties and registration fees, see the National 
Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act (New Delhi, India); Tapas K. 
Sen (1999), “Reform of Stamp Duty Administration in Orissa”, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy 
(New Delhi, India); and Arindam Das-Gupta (2002), “The Stamps and Registration Department in Karnataka: A 
Review of Institutions and Administration”, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development and Research (Mumbai, India). 
3 
title.8  For the most part, government agents (called “sub-registrars”) are not concerned with the 
legal validity of the document but only with the correct payment of the fee.  Table 1 shows the 
composition of these three forms of charges for various States. 
 
 
Table 1. Composition of Stamp Duties and Registration Fees, Selected States, 1992-1993 
(as percent of total) 
State Non-judicial Stamp Duties Judicial Stamp Duties Registration Fees 
Andhra Pradesh 82.3 7.6 10.1 
Assam 45.1 26.2 28.7 
Bihar 15.1 60.3 24.6 
Gujarat 85.2 2.6 12.1 
Haryana 88.9 6.2 4.9 
Karnataka 71.1 9.2 19.8 
Kerala 81.6 5.7 12.7 
Madhya Pradesh 63.3 7.9 28.8 
Maharashtra 85.8 4.3 9.9 
Orissa 74.5 9.6 15.9 
Punjab 83.7 5.2 11.1 
Rajasthan 76.5 4.7 18.8 
Tamil Nadu 84.2 4.8 11.0 
Uttar Pradesh 44.3 35.2 20.5 
West Bengal 58.4 18.6 23.0 
Source: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act 
(New Delhi, India). 
 
 
Under the Indian Constitution, stamp duties and registration fees are divided into those 
imposed under the Union List (or those set by the central government) and those imposed under 
the State List (or those determined by the individual States).  Under Entry 91 of the coming 
together List (I), the central government sets the rates of stamp duties on bills of exchange, bills 
of lading, cheques, promissory notes, letters of credit, insurance policies, share transfers, 
debentures, proxies, and receipts-in-brief.  The rates are uniform across all States.  The collection 
of the duties is the responsibility of the State government in which the transaction occurs, and the 
State government retains all revenues collected by the State, although the States sometimes 
allocate a portion of the duties to the local government in which the collection occurs. 
 
Under Entry 63 of the State List (II), State governments have the exclusive power to fix 
the stamp duties for other instruments listed on the State List.  The specific items taxed vary by 
                                                 
8  The stamp duty and registration fee department of Maharashtra is experimenting with a pilot program in which the 
payment of the registration fee provides legal protection of ownership and property rights, a system similar to the 
Torrens system used in various countries around the world (e.g., Australia, Thailand, the United Kingdom).  The 
Torrens system is a system of registration of titles to land introduced into South Australia by the Real Property Act 
(Act 15 of 1857-58), drafted by Sir Robert Torrens, whose essential feature is the guarantee by the government of 
property-registered titles.  The system has been generally adopted in Australia and British Columbia, and in its 
original or modified form in some other countries, including some states in the United States.  For a discussion of 
this system, especially its current use, see Lynden Griggs (2001), “Torrens Title in a Digital World”, ELaw - 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 8 (3). 
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State.  For example, Karnataka imposes stamp duties on 55 separate items;9 Andhra Pradesh, on 
56 separate items; Kerala, on 58 items; and Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, and Nagaland, on 
65 items.10  The stamp duties are imposed on instruments that generally fall into five main 
categories: 
 
• Instruments that relate to conveyance and property transfer; 
 
• Instruments that are connected with loans and advances; 
 
• Instruments that related to capital market transactions; 
 
• Instruments that are used in daily business and commercial transactions; and 
 
• Instruments that are executed under other statutes for record-keeping purposes. 
 
For most States, the bulk of stamp duty revenues comes from the tax on a “conveyance” (or a 
deed of sale).11  Duties collected on conveyances typically account for 70 to 90 percent of total 
(non-judicial stamp duty) revenues in the States.12  The stamp duties can be imposed an ad 
valorem rate, a specific rate, or a mix of ad valorem and specific rates.  In all cases, it is the 
buyer who is legally liable for the stamp duties. 
 
As an example, the stamp duty rates on conveyances in Orissa for the year 1999 are given 
in Table 2.  For all types of jurisdictions, the basic duty rate is 4.2 percent; additional charges 
differentially increase the total duty rate for different jurisdictions, sometimes up to 17.7 percent.  
Table 3 shows the maximum stamp duty rate on conveyances for selected States.  As shown in 
Table 3, the basic stamp duty rates are quite high and variable; additional charges are often 
                                                 
9 See Government of Karnataka, Finance Department (2001), 1st Report of the Tax Reforms Commission (Karnataka, 
India). 
10  According to the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), the instruments include: 
acknowledgement, administration bond, adoption deed, affidavit, memorandum of agreement, agreement relation to 
deposit of title, appointment in execution of power, appraisement of valuations, apprenticeship deed, article of 
association of a company, article of clerkship, award, bill of exchange, bill of lading, bond, bottomry bond, 
cancellation, certificate of sale, certificate or other document, charter party, composition deed, conveyance, copy of 
extract, counterpart or duplicate, customs duty, debenture, delivery order in receipt of goods, divorce, entry as an 
advocate, exchange of property, further charge, gift, indemnity bond, lease, letter of allotment of shares, letter of 
licence, memorandum of association, mortgage deed, mortgage of a crop, notarial act, note or memorandum, note of 
protest by the master of a ship, partition, partnership, policy of insurance, power of attorney, promissory note, 
protest of bill, proxy, receipt, reconveyance of mortgaged property, release, respondentia bond, settlement, share 
warrants, shipping order, surrender of lease, transfer, transfer of lease by way of assignment, trust, and warrant for 
goods.  See National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act (New 
Delhi, India). 
11  Under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, a conveyance is an instrument by which an owner of a property transfers his 
or her interest to another individual.  More precisely, “…a conveyance includes a conveyance on sale, every 
instrument, every decree or final order of any Civil court, every order made by the High Court under section of 394 
of the Companies Act, 1956 (I of 1956) in respect of amalgamation of companies, sale of air rights, by which 
property, whether movable or immovable or any estate or interest in any property is transferred to, or vested in, any 
other person, intervivos…” 
12 See National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act (New Delhi, 
India). 
5 
imposed on different types of conveyances, which serve to increase the tax rates and their 
variation across the States. 
 
 
Table 2. Stamp Duty Rates on Conveyances in Orissa 
(as percentage tax rate on value of transaction) 
Value of 
Transaction 
Rural 
Areas 
Urban Areas under Town Planning 
and Improvement Trust Act 
Urban Areas under 
Development Authorities Act 
Rs. 0-2000 6.2 9.2 10.2 
Rs. 2001-5000 7.7 11.2 12.2 
Rs. 5001-10,000 8.7 13.2 14.2 
Rs. 10,000-25,000 9.7 14.7 15.7 
Above Rs. 25,000 10.7 16.7 17.7 
Source: Tapas K. Sen (1999), “Reform of Stamp Duty Administration in Orissa”, National Institute of Public 
Finance and Policy (New Delhi, India). 
Note: In all cases the total stamp duty rate equals the basic rate of 4.2 percent plus an additional charge. 
  
 
Table 3. Maximum Stamp Duty Rates on Conveyances, Selected States  
State Maximum Basic Rate Maximum Additional Charges 
Andhra Pradesh 5.0 -- 
Assam 10.0 -- 
Bihar 7.0 -- 
Bombay 10.0 -- 
Daman 6.0 -- 
Gujarat 8.0 -- 
Himachal Pradesh 12.0 -- 
Karnataka 10.0 4.5 
Kerala 8.0 -- 
Madhya Pradesh 7.5 -- 
Maharashtra 10.0 -- 
Mizoram 9.0 -- 
Nagaland 5.0 -- 
Orissa 4.2 13.5 
Pondicherry 9.5 -- 
Punjab 6.25 -- 
Tamil Nadu 8.0 -- 
Uttar Pradesh 12.5 -- 
West Bengal 5.0 2.0 
Sources: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and 
the Stamp Act (New Delhi, India); Tapas K. Sen (1999), “Reform of Stamp Duty 
Administration in Orissa”, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (New Delhi, 
India); Government of Karnataka, Finance Department (2001), 1st Report of the Tax 
Reforms Commission (Karnataka, India), and various documents provided by the National 
Institute of Public Finance and Policy. 
 
 
It is important to note that the stamp duties are directly or indirectly related to a number 
of other taxes.  For example, the value of the transaction affects the individual income tax via the 
inclusion of short- and long-term capital gains in the income tax.  Similarly, valuation affects an 
individual’s tax liability in the gift tax, as well as in the wealth tax.  The property tax in most 
urban areas is based on the annual rental value of a property.  Nevertheless, the annual rental 
6 
value of a property is, or should be, closely related to its capital value, as revealed in the market 
sale of the property.  Indeed, many urban local bodies use estimates of market values as 
“guidance values” in establishing annual rental values for different types of properties in 
different locations within the jurisdiction, and some are also experimenting with the move to a 
property tax based on capital value.  In all of these cases, the declared value of the transaction as 
used to calculate stamp duties has direct relevance to the tax base used to calculate these other 
taxes.  Of course, the information conveyed in the stamp duty transaction must be connected in 
some way to the collection of these other taxes if administration of stamp duties is to affect 
collections of other taxes, and at present it appears that these connections are seldom if ever 
made.  In part, this failure to link the various taxes may occur because the taxes are the 
responsibilities of different levels of government: State governments of stamp duties, the central 
government for the individual income tax, the gift tax, and the wealth tax, and local governments 
for the property tax.  As discussed in more detail below, it is also possible that State sales and 
central excise taxes are affected in more indirect ways by the declared value of the market 
transaction. 
 
 
B. Administrative Problems with Stamp Duties 
 
There are many serious administrative issues that arise with the stamp duties.  Various 
reforms that address these administrative problems have also been suggested by these studies.13 
 
Valuation.  There is widespread agreement that the values declared for stamp duty 
transactions are grossly understated, due largely to the extremely high duty rate on conveyances.  
For example, in Maharashtra it is estimated that 70 percent of stamp duty documents are 
undervalued by 20 percent or more.  Other observers claim that undervaluation may approach 50 
percent for many kinds of transactions. 
 
Avoidance.  Because of the high stamp duty burdens, individuals have found a variety of 
ways to avoid legally the tax burden.  For example, the use of general power of attorney under 
which a sale deed is replaced with a sale agreement without possession allows an individual to 
transfer effective ownership to another without becoming liable for stamp duties.  The use of 
transfers with cooperative housing has a similar effect.  Other common avoidance methods 
include: 
 
• The use of an instrument of lease for the long term payment of rent; 
 
• The use of a declaratory suit filed in court under which property is transferred under the 
court decree; 
 
• The use of an instrument of dissolution of a partnership in which property is taken as 
payment for the ending of a partnership; 
                                                 
13  See National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act (New Delhi, 
India); Tapas K. Sen (1999), “Reform of Stamp Duty Administration in Orissa”, National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy (New Delhi, India); and the Government of Karnataka, Finance Department (2001), 1st Report of the Tax 
Reforms Commission (Karnataka, India). 
7 
 
• The use of an instrument of release in which a co-owner releases his or her share to 
another co-owner in exchange for some consideration; 
 
• The exchange of properties of  much different values; the splitting of one property into 
smaller properties to avoid higher stamp duty rates; and 
 
• The registration of properties in neighboring, lower-tax States.14 
 
Evasion.  The high stamp duty rates have also created a strong incentive for individuals to 
evade illegally the tax burden.  The most obvious way for evasion is via undervaluation of the 
transaction.  Individuals may also evade the legal liability by failing to register the transaction.  
Because registration creates a large stamp duty liability but does not confer legally accepted 
property rights, there are strong incentives for non-registration. 
 
Tax Administration – Collection Costs.  Although precise information on collection costs 
is not typically available, the administrative costs of collecting stamp duties are often believed to 
be very high relative to the revenues generated.  In some cases this occurs because some forms of 
instruments are unproductive sources and generate little revenues.  Few States have tried 
computerization or the use of modern methods associated with “e-government” to achieve 
collection cost savings. 
 
Tax Administration – Corruption.  Tax collection officials are widely seen as “unfriendly, 
unhelpful, and corrupt”.15  There are few attempts to make collection offices very “user 
friendly”.  
 
Tax Administration – Fraud.  Fraudulent production and use of stamp paper has been 
recognized as a significant problem in the administration of stamp taxes and duties.  It recently 
took on national significance with the eruption in late 2003 of one of the largest financial 
scandals to hit the country.  The Telgi scam refers to the alleged activities, largely undetected for 
several years, of Abdul Karim Telgi, the head of a highly effective organization that had been 
printing and circulating duplicate stamps and stamp paper throughout India.  The States of 
Maharashtra and Karnataka were apparently the hardest hit, which is not surprising given the 
buoyant conditions experienced in their property markets for at least part of that time.  Those 
States have special teams probing the case.  It is unclear just how much the fraud cost the States 
involved, but it has been reported to be as high as Rs. 780,000 million over the last ten years, or 
about US$17 billion16.  The political ramifications of this news have been substantial because a 
number of politicians and top police officials were among the more than 50 people arrested for 
suspected association with this fraud.  Revelations as to the depth of penetration in government 
and the scope of fraudulent activities have figured prominently in news reports in the sensitive 
period leading up to national and state elections.  
                                                 
14  See Tapas K. Sen (1999), “Reform of Stamp Duty Administration in Orissa”, National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy (New Delhi, India). 
15  See Government of Karnataka (2001), Finance Department, 1st Report of the Tax Reforms Commission 
(Karnataka, India). 
16 S. Arvind “Stamping out Stamp Scams” Hindu Business Line, January 2, 2004 
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Those involved in the production and sale of fraudulent tax paper had apparently 
discovered the opportunity because the government administrative and supply systems were easy 
to penetrate and exploit. The high stamp duty rates raised substantially the rewards of engaging 
in the fraud.  The breadth of this scam as well as the apparent complicity of officials in various 
layers of government and the bureaucracy in the scam hints at the perverse incentives embodied 
in high stamp tax rates coupled with weak controls. 
 
This episode indicates the urgent need for administrative reform, along the lines of the 
reforms being introduced in Karnataka.  It also highlights the potential for abuse when tax rates 
are very high.  Note that the use of fraudulent tax paper is not the same as evasion because 
individuals who buy the paper may well do so believing that the stamp duty papers are 
legitimate.  However, for both evasion of the duties and the use of fraudulent papers the state 
governments lose tax revenues. 
 
Individual Compliance Costs.  Because of the numerous steps required to pay stamp 
duties, the burden imposed on individuals from the presence of the stamp duties is quite 
significant.  To illustrate, consider the specific case in Orissa in which an individual seller is 
attempting to complete the sale of a piece of urban land.17  The necessary steps for the payment 
of stamp duties (and the registration of the sale deed) to complete the transaction include the 
following: 
 
1. The seller has to purchase stamp paper of the required value from a licensed stamp 
vendor for his sale instrument, provided the value of stamps does not exceed Rs. 50,000.  
If it does, required stamp paper must be obtained from the Treasury or Sub-treasury of 
the Government of Orissa. 
 
2. After purchasing stamp paper, the seller must get the instrument written on the stamp 
paper by a licensed deed-writer, by an advocate, or by himself. The instrument written by 
any other person is chargeable with extra fees. 
 
3. After the instrument is written and executed by the seller (or his authorized attorney 
under a power of attorney), a copy of the instrument must be made and filed along with 
the original instrument. 
 
4. The instrument and its copy must be presented to the Registering Officer (RO) for 
registration. 
 
5. The RO must check the adequacy of the stamp duty paid and also the admissibility of the 
instrument under the Registration Act. If the instrument is presented after four months 
from the date of execution, the RO only registers the document with the approval of the 
District Registrar on payment of the prescribed fines.  If the District Registrar does not 
approve late filing, then the RO refuses registration of the instrument. 
 
                                                 
17  See Tapas K. Sen (1999), “Reform of Stamp Duty Administration in Orissa”, National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy (New Delhi, India). 
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6. On presentation of the instrument, if the RO finds that the instrument is inadequately 
stamped, only the admission of execution is recorded, and the instrument is impounded 
without registration and sent to the District Registrar who has been appointed as 
Collector for the purpose. 
 
7. The RO must also verify that the value of the property stated in the instrument is 
correctly set forth.  If the stated value is the same or above the guideline market value, 
the instrument is registered and returned to the party. If the stated value is below the 
guideline value, the seller must pay the difference between the payable stamp duty as per 
the guideline value and the actual amount paid.  If the deficit amount is paid, the 
instrument is registered; if it is not and there is disagreement regarding the amount of 
stamp duty payable, then the RO refers the instrument to the District Sub-Registrar for 
further review. If disagreement persists even after this review, the District Sub-Registrar 
refers the case to the Deputy Inspector General of Registration or the Joint Inspector 
General of Registration for disposal. 
 
8. The RO must also ensure that applicable certificates have been furnished before 
registering a document. These may include one or more of the following: 
 
a. a no-objection certificate under the Income Tax Act; 
 
b. permission of the tahsildar under the Orissa Land Revenue Act or permission 
under from the Sub-Collector; 
 
c. permission of the Endowment Commissioner under the Hindu Religious 
Endowment Act; 
 
d. permission of the Government of Orissa or permission of the Collector in the case 
of government leasehold land; and 
 
e. permission of the Consolidation Officer for land under consolidation operation. 
 
9. After the RO verifies that all the conditions required for admission of the instrument have 
been met, the document is registered on payment of the prescribed fees.  Any refusal to 
register a document is governed by various sections of Orissa acts, and may be appealed 
to the District Register at the first instance. 
 
10. The individual must receive permission for the transaction under the Urban Land Ceiling 
Act and also obtain a clearance certificate from the Income Tax Department. 
 
In the case of the sale of a piece of land in a rural area of Orissa, the same general 
procedures must be followed, with the exception that it is not necessary to comply with the 
Urban Land Ceiling Act or the Income Tax Department.  Complications are also introduced by 
the many rates in the stamp duty rate structures, as well as by the many different types of stamps 
that may be required and that may not be available.  Similar procedures must be followed in most 
other States.  These procedures are clearly complex, cumbersome, and burdensome on 
10 
individuals, and contribute to the problems of valuation, avoidance, evasion, corruption, and 
fraud. 
 
Summary.  The existence of these administrative problems is well known and widely 
recognized.  Overall, there is at least anecdotal evidence that the amount of revenues lost due to 
the variety of fraud, evasion, and avoidance mechanisms is enormous.  In fact, some officials 
estimate that the amount of revenues lost due to these measures is roughly equal to the amount of 
revenues actually collected.  There is little evidence that enforcement measures are used with any 
frequency. 
 
These administrative problems also give rise to a range of economic issues.  Who bears 
the burden of the stamp duties?  Do the high and variable stamp duty rates distort economic 
transactions, especially those in urban land markets?  What would be the effects on stamp duty 
revenues of reforms that lower duty rates?  These issues are discussed in the next sections. 
 
 
C.  Stamp Duty Rates: Some International Practices 
 
Stamp duties and taxes on real estate transactions in India are quite high in comparison 
with the practice in a number of other countries, as shown in Table 4.18  Few jurisdictions in this 
group impose stamp duties exceeding 5 percent, and even in those cases the higher rates are 
reserved for exceptional cases such as very high value personal property.  Lower stamp duty 
rates are not limited to industrial countries; countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines have 
stamp duty rates in the range of 1 to 2 percent.  As noted earlier, the high stamp duty rates in 
Indian states have likely been counterproductive in that they have provided powerful incentives 
for corruption and fraud in systems with weak tax administration. This evidence shows that a 
wide range of countries on the income scale have opted for a tax rate structure that may be both 
less distortionary and less difficult to administer. 
                                                 
18 Table 4 summarizes more detailed information provided in Annex I. 
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Table 4: Stamp Taxes on Immovable Property: International Comparisons 
Country 
Tax (percent of value 
of transaction or 
market price) 
Exemptions (US$) Lower Boundary of Highest Rate (US$) 
Exchange 
Rate 
(US$/LOC as 
of 1/7/04) 
Australia (New South Wales) 1 to 5.5 sliding  $385,000 0.77 
The Bahamas 2 to 10 sliding First time home buyers with value up to $250,000 $250,000 1 
China 0.05 
Property donated to the 
government, or social housing 
for widowed, aged, injured, or 
schools 
  
Hong Kong* 3.75    
Indonesia 5 Amount of exemption is local government decision   
Ireland (commercial) 1 to 9 sliding Properties less than $12,700 $190,500 1.27 
Ireland (residential) 0 to 9 sliding Houses less than $161,000 $806,451 1.27 
Japan No specified amount    
Malaysia 1 to 4 sliding  $390,000 0.26 
Mexico 2 to 3    
New Zealand Abolished in 1999    
Pakistan (Punjab) 6    
Pakistan (Sindh) 3 to 6    
Pakistan (Islamabad) 6    
Philippines 1 to 1.5  $18 0.018 
Singapore 1 to 3 sliding  $313,200 0.58 
South Korea** .015 to .2  $80,000 0.0008 
Taiwan (Taipei) 0.1    
Thailand No specified amount    
US (Florida) 0.7    
Vietnam 2    
* Tax rate is only for Real Estate Investment & Trusts 
** The sliding rate scale largely declines with value whereas for all other sliding scales above, the rates increase with value. 
Source: Tax Notes International, various issues. 
 
 
III. The Distributional Effects of Stamp Duties 
 
 By law, stamp duties are nominally paid by the buyer involved in the transaction.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that it is the buyer who ultimately pays, or bears the 
true economic burden, of the duties.  Just as an excise tax may be borne by the buyer of the good 
or by the seller or by both, the true incidence of the stamp duties may bear no relation to the 
statutory incidence.  
 
The division of the duties between buyers and sellers depends upon the elasticities of 
demand and of supply.  The elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity 
demanded divided by the percentage change in price; the elasticity of supply is similarly defined.  
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If buyers are willing and able to pay the price inclusive of the stamp duties without significantly 
decreasing their purchases – that is, if demand is “inelastic” – then they are likely to bear most of 
the burden.  On the other hand, if sellers offer for sale the same quantity without much regard to 
the price they receive (or an inelastic supply), then it is the sellers who will pay the stamp duties.  
With buyers and sellers both responsive to the price of the transaction, as seems likely with most 
transactions covered by stamp duties, then the division of the duties is more difficult to 
determine.  In general, those with the less responsive actions will bear the bulk of the burden.19 
 
There are two main issues in determining the distributional effects of stamp duties.  First, 
what is the incidence of stamp duties or, equivalently, who bears the burden of stamp duties, 
buyers or sellers?  In the analysis of this question, the statutory (or legal) incidence of the duties 
is largely irrelevant.  Second, given the incidence of the duties, how do they affect the 
distribution of income? 
 
 The absence of much detailed information on the characteristics of markets in which 
stamp duties are imposed, especially urban land markets, makes quantitative analysis of stamp 
duty incidence impossible, so that it is not possible to determine precisely whether it is the buyer 
or the seller who pays the stamp duties. 
 
However, in some respects the division of the burden between buyers and sellers is 
unimportant.  Because the duties are borne by either the buyer or the seller of the property, and 
because either party seems likely to be among the higher income classes, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that, on the issue of vertical equity, stamp duties fall more heavily on the rich than on 
the poor. 
 
It is also likely that the stamp duties are borne in part by those owners who do not even 
trade their properties.  Consider stamp duties on the sale of immovable property, like land.  To 
the extent that the price of land net of the stamp duties falls (e.g., sellers bear some of the 
burden), then all owners of land bear some of the duties, even those who do not sell their land, 
because all land is worth less.  This “capitalization” implies that all owners of property subject to 
stamp duties pay part of the tax.20  Because ownership of such property is concentrated in higher 
income groups, the burden of the stamp duties again falls more heavily on the wealthy. 
                                                 
19  It is straightforward to show that impact of a unit tax T on the price P paid by consumers in a competitive market 
equals 
 
 ∆P/∆T = [ES /(ES – ED)], 
 
where ES is the elasticity of supply and ED is the elasticity of demand (defined as non-positive.  For example, if ED is 
zero, or if ES is infinite, then in either case the price will rise by the full amount of the tax, and buyers will bear the 
full burden. 
20  To illustrate, consider a market for immovable property in which there are three types of participants.  Agents 1 
and 2 buy and sell property, respectively; agent 3 owns property but neither buys nor sells additional property.  The 
total quantity of property Q0 is assumed to be fixed, and the initial quantity owned by agent type i is denoted Qi, 
where Σi Qi = Q0.  In the absence of any stamp duties on the purchase or sale of property, the demand for property of 
each agent type is assumed to take a simple linear form, or  
 
 QD1 = a1 – b1 P 
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However, in terms of horizontal equity issues, individuals are likely to be treated very 
differently because all transfers are not treated equally under the stamp duties.  As noted earlier, 
many transactions are grossly undervalued, and many individuals are also able to avoid or evade 
the duties.  As a result, there are likely to be many instances in which uniform treatment of 
individuals and of transactions is violated.  
 
There should no question that stamp duties fall short of many criteria for an “equitable” 
tax.  They are not tailored to the individual circumstances of the taxpayer.  They may be evaded 
by those who are dishonest and avoided by those who find legal means to circumvent the duties, 
both of which affect the horizontal and vertical equity of the duties.  Nevertheless, their overall 
impact is likely to be similar to that of a modestly progressive tax.  In this regard, evidence from 
a similar type of tax, the immovable property transfer tax in Bangladesh suggests that transfer 
taxes are a moderately progressive tax.21 
 
 
IV. The Effects of Stamp Duties on Resource Allocation 
 
Because stamp duties are a tax on the value of a transaction, they are essentially a tax on 
differences of opinion about the desirability of holding property.22  In the absence of the stamp 
duties, a transfer will occur if the buyer believes the property to be worth more than the seller; 
with the duties, the buyer must believe the property to be worth more than the seller by at least 
the amount of the tax.  If opinions differ widely, as may be the case when the economy is 
growing and markets are active, or if the duty rates are low, the stamp duties may have little 
effect on transactions.  At other times, however, stamp duties may be a significant deterrent to 
the exchange of properties, especially when duty rates are high.  In this latter case, the stamp 
                                                                                                                                                             
 QD2 = a2 – b2 P 
 
 QD3 = a3 = Q3 , 
 
where P is the price of the property.  Agents 1 and 2 have demands that respond to price; agent 3 demands the same 
fixed amount regardless of price.  Equilibrium in this market requires that the sum of the individual stock demands 
equals the total stock of property; equivalently, equilibrium requires that the sum of excess demands for property (or 
the flow of property transfers) equals zero.  In either case, the equilibrium price P of land can be shown to equal 
 
 P = [a1 + a2 + a3 – Q0]/[b1 + b2]. 
 
Now introduce stamp duties at rate t, imposed only on property that is bought or sold, where P denotes the gross-of-
tax price and PN≡P(1-t) is the net-of-tax price.  The demand for transferred property depends upon the gross-of-tax 
price, while the supply depends on the net-of-tax price.  Assuming without loss of generality that agent 1 is the net 
demander of property and agent 2 is the net supplier, then the equilibrium net-of-tax price PN  equals 
 
 PN = (1-t) [a1 + a2 + a3 – Q0]/[b1 + (1-t)b2]. 
 
This net-of-tax price of property is the price of all property, whether transferred or not.  As can be seen in the 
solution for PN, an increase in the stamp duty rate reduces the net-of-tax price (as long as b1≠0). 
21  See James Alm (1989), “The Immovable Property Transfer Tax”, in Larry Schroeder, ed., Financing 
Governmental Decentralization: The Case of Bangladesh (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.), 89-114. 
22 See Carl S. Shoup (1969), Public Finance (Chicago, IL: Aldine Press). 
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duties are likely to have particularly harmful effects.  By reducing the volume of transactions, the 
duties may hinder the transfer of properties (especially immovable properties) to more 
productive uses.  In addition, methods used to avoid or to evade the tax, as discussed earlier, may 
be wasteful.  The timing of development may also be delayed if the presence of the stamp duties 
lead the owner to delay the sale of the property to developers until he or she can accumulate the 
funds to develop the property himself or herself, something referred to as the “lock-in effect”.23 
 
A smoothly functioning market in property serves a useful economic purpose by 
encouraging the transfer of resources to more productive uses.  Of course, transfers are not 
always productive (e.g., property bought and sold for purely speculative reasons).  However, an 
individual will generally purchase property only if he or she expects a positive return from the 
transaction.  As noted long ago by Ricardo, stamp duties and other similar kinds of transfer taxes 
“…prevent the national capital from being distributed in the way most beneficial to the 
community”.24  Because the stamp duties are imposed at such high rates, it is likely that they 
discourage productive transfers and diminish the efficiency of resource allocation, especially in 
urban land markets. 
 
The main efficiency concern with the stamp duties is their possible impact on the 
efficient exchange of properties, especially in urban land markets.  As with the incidence of the 
stamp duties, the absence of detailed information on such markets makes it difficult to assess this 
issue very precisely.  Nevertheless, some suggestive evidence on the allocative effects of stamp 
duties can be obtained from a simple analytical framework, based on the measurement of the 
“excess burden” of a tax and, especially, of the “marginal excess burden” of a tax. 
 
 The excess burden EB of a tax is a measure of the loss of efficiency due to its imposition.  
In a single competitive market, the excess burden can be calculated as 
 
 EB = - ½ t2 P Q [ES ED /(ES – ED)], 
 
where t is the stamp duty rate, P is the transaction price, Q is the quantity exchanged, and (ES, 
ED) are the elasticities of supply or of demand, defined as in the earlier incidence discussion. 
  
Of more interest is the marginal excess burden MEB of a tax, or the increase in the excess 
burden of a tax per one rupee of additional tax revenue generated.  Using the same notation as 
for the EB, the MEB can be calculated as 
 
 MEB = - t [ES ED /(ES – ED)]. 
 
The MEB of taxation is especially useful to government in deciding how to generate additional 
revenues.  On efficiency grounds, a government should raise an additional rupee of tax revenues 
with the instrument that has the lowest MEB. 
                                                 
23  See Roger S. Smith (1979), “The Effects of Land Taxes on Development Timing and Rates of Change in Land 
Prices”, in Roy W. Bahl, ed., The Taxation of Urban Property in Less Developed Countries (Madison, WI: The 
University of Wisconsin Press), 137-162. 
24  The quotation is from Carl S. Shoup (1960), Ricardo on Taxation (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 
57. 
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Calculation of either the EB or the MEB of stamp duties requires information on the 
relevant elasticities and on the stamp duty rates, and there are no estimates of these elasticities.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to calculate the MEB for different combinations of tax rates and 
elasticities, in order to illustrate the possible magnitude of the MEB of stamp duties. 
 
Suppose, for example, that the stamp duty rate is 10 percent, the elasticity of demand is -
1, and the elasticity of supply is 1.  Then the MEB of the stamp duty is 0.05, so that raising 1 
additional rupee in tax revenues generates a misallocation valued at Rs. 0.05.  The MEB 
increases with an increase in the stamp duty rate or with increases in the (absolute value) of the 
elasticities.  If the stamp duty rate is 15 percent, the elasticity of demand is -2.5, and the elasticity 
of supply is 2.5, then the MEB of the stamp duty is 0.1875.  The MEB for various combinations 
of the parameters is given in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5. Marginal Excess Burden of Stamp Duties: Partial Equilibrium Model 
Elasticity of Demand, Elasticity of Supply  
Stamp Duty Rate -0.5, 0.5 -1, 1 -2.5, 2.5 -5, 5 -10, 10 
0.05 0.0125 0.025 0.0625 0.125 0.25 
0.10 0.025 0.05 0.125 0.25 0.5 
0.15 0.0375 0.075 0.1875 0.375 0.75 
0.20 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 1 
0.25 0.0625 0.125 0.3125 0.625 -- 
 
 
 In order to put these numbers in some perspective, it is useful to compare these 
magnitudes with those of other taxes in other countries.  For example, Ballard, Shoven, and 
Whalley (1985) calculate the MEB of different U.S. taxes.25  For labor taxes, they estimate 
MEBs that vary from 0.121 to 0.230, depending on the relevant elasticities; for sales taxes, the 
MEB varies from 0.256 to 0.388; and for excises, it varies from 0.035 to 0.115. 
 
 While illustrative, however, these largely mechanical calculations are likely to grossly 
underestimate the true efficiency cost of stamp duties because they fail to capture some 
dimensions of behavior that stamp duties are likely to distort. 
 
 First, the MEB framework assumes that there is a single “partial equilibrium” market in 
which a distortion exists.  The recognition that land markets are only one market among many 
will substantially increase the distortions from stamp duties.  For example, suppose that the 
market in which stamp duties are imposed is one of only two markets.  In this more “general 
equilibrium” framework, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the elasticity of supply of the 
taxed commodity can be much larger than assumed in the calculations in Table 5, which implies 
a significant increase in the MEB of stamp duties. 
 
                                                 
25  See Charles L. Ballard, John B. Shoven, and John Whalley (1985), “General Equilibrium Computations of the 
Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States”, The American Economic Review, 75 (1), 128-138. 
16 
To be more precise, assume that there are two markets (or commodities), one of which is 
subject to a tax and each of which has production with a constant returns to scale production 
technology that uses capital and labor.  In general, the implied elasticity of supply of the taxed 
commodity depends upon a variety of parameters, such as the factor shares of capital and labor 
and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the two production functions.  
Nevertheless, the elasticity of supply of the taxed good increases significantly as the relative 
share of the taxed good in overall production declines.  For example, even for “low” elasticities 
of substitution in production (e.g., 0.5), the elasticity of supply of the taxed good can easily 
exceed 100, as long as the share of the taxed good in overall production does not exceed 20 
percent.  With an elasticity of supply of 100, the MEBs for various combinations of stamp duty 
rates and elasticities of demand can be enormous, as shown in Table 6.  These computations 
suggest that if the elasticity of demand is greater than one, the efficiency loss of the tax absorbs a 
substantial share of the revenues generated. 
 
 
Table 6. Marginal Excess Burden of Stamp Duties: Two Market Model 
Elasticity of Demand, Elasticity of Supply Stamp Duty 
Rate -0.5,100 -1,100 -2.5,100 -5,100 -10,100 
0.10 0.0498 0.0990 0.2439 0.4762 0.9091 
0.15 0.0746 0.1485 0.3659 0.7143 -- 
0.20 0.0995 0.1980 0.4878 0.9524 -- 
 
 
 Second, the MEB framework ignores the presence of stamp duty evasion and avoidance.  
Evasion and avoidance will increase, and increase substantially, the magnitude of the MEB.  
Recall that the MEB is defined as the increase in the excess burden of a tax per one rupee of 
additional tax revenue generated.  Because evasion and avoidance reduce the positive impact of 
an increase in stamp duty rates on revenues, they reduce the denominator of the MEB, thereby 
increasing the MEB.  For example, consider the case in which the stamp duty tax rate is 10 
percent and the elasticities of demand and of supply are (-2.5, 2.5).  Suppose that an increase in 
stamp duties leads to a reduction in revenues by, say, 20 percent, relative to the scenarios 
assumed in the calculations in Table 5; that is, the increase in the duty rate increases revenues by 
Rs. 1 less 10 percent of Rs. 1, due to erosion of the stamp duty base from evasion and/or 
avoidance of the stamp duties.  Then the MEB of the stamp duties is correspondingly increased 
from 0.125 to [0.125/(1-0.20)], or to 0.15625.  Indeed, in the extreme case in which an increase 
in the duty rate does not increase stamp duty revenues at all, the MEB of the stamp duty is 
infinite. 
 
 Third, the MEB framework ignores several distortions that affect the efficiency of land 
markets.  Stamp duties may induce individuals to change how they use the asset, and/or to 
change how they say they are using the asset.  For example, suppose owners of rental housing 
rent the apartment rather than sell the apartment, in order to avoid paying the stamp duties.  
Consequently, the presence of renters may slow the rate at which properties are turned into 
different uses, thereby slowing development. 
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 Fourth, and most importantly, there is emerging evidence that urban land markets are a 
crucial element in the economic development of cities.  Policies that hinder industrial, 
commercial, and residential development of urban land can prevent such economic development.  
At the present time, the supply of land for urban development is largely controlled by the public 
sector, and it seems unlikely that the public sector channels can provide land in sufficient 
amounts to support the growing demand for urban land.  In this setting, it is essential that private 
sector be encouraged to acquire agricultural, vacant, or underutilized land, and to use this land 
for economic development.  However, private sector acquisition is stalled by a wide range of 
public policies, including the Urban Land Ceiling Act, rent control, planning requirements, 
zoning regulations, property taxes, and stamp duties.  The combined effect of such policies is 
high land prices, sluggish market responses, and high levels of informality in urban land 
markets.26  However, it is virtually impossible to capture these types of distortions in any 
“simple” model of urban land markets.  When one considers the full range of all distortions, it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that stamp duties are an especially distorting tax whose use on 
efficiency grounds should be discouraged.  On this basis, the estimates presented in Tables 5 and 
6 should be considered lower bounds – and very much lower bounds – on the true distorting 
effects of stamp duties. 
 
 
V. The Revenue Performance of Stamp Duties 
 
Stamp duties and registration fees amount to a significant source of revenues for most of 
the Indian State governments.  According to 2002-2003 budget estimates from the Reserve Bank 
of India (2003), stamp duties and registration fees generate for all States Rs. 132,588 million in 
revenues, or 6.2 percent of total tax revenue of the States, behind only State sales taxes (43.3 
percent) and State excise duties (9.4 percent) in relative importance.27  This section examines the 
revenue performance of stamp duties.  This performance has several dimensions.  First, what are 
the levels of stamp duty collections in the States, and how have stamp duty revenues varied over 
time for the various States?  Second, what are the estimated revenue losses due to the widespread 
undervaluation of transactions?  Third, how are stamp duties linked to other taxes in the Indian 
public finance system?  In particular, how does undervaluation in stamp duties affect revenues 
from other taxes that are linked either directly or indirectly to the duties?  Fourth, how are stamp 
duty revenues, as well as revenues of the other linked taxes, likely to be affected by a change in 
stamp duty rates? 
 
 
A. Stamp Duty Collections and Trends 
 
 Table 7 gives revenues from non-judicial stamp duties for selected States for 2000-2001, 
and also shows the total revenues from stamp duties and registration fees for all States for the 
same year.28  Tables 8 and 9 give some additional information on the tax structures of selected 
                                                 
26  For a detailed discussion of these distortions, with a special focus on Tamil Nadu, see David Dowall (2003), 
“Tamil Nadu Urban Land Management and Urban Planning Assessment”. 
27  See Reserve Bank of India (2003), State Finances – A Study of Budgets 2002-03 (New Delhi, India). 
28  These data come from different sources, and so are not strictly comparable.  Researchers at the National Institute 
of Public Finance and Policy collected the information on non-judicial stamp duties; the information on stamp duties 
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States.  As shown in Tables 7, 8, and 9, stamp duties are typically among the third or fourth most 
important source of own-source revenues, with some exceptions. 
 
 
Table 7. Revenues from Stamp Duties and Registration Fees, 2000-2001 (in Rs. millions) 
State Non-judicial Stamp Duties Stamp Duties and Registration Fees 
Andhra Pradesh 7663.0  6709.3  
Arunachal Pradesh --- 2.5 
Assam 268.2 386.4 
Bihar 1366.9 3434.8 
Chattisgarh --- 623.7 
Delhi --- 1916.8 
Goa 155.5 219.1 
Gujarat 4778.3 5374.2 
Haryana 3791.2 4192.4 
Himachal Pradesh --- 292.2 
Jammu and Kashmir --- 210.6 
Jharkhand --- 0 
Karnataka 7078.1 6381.2 
Kerala 3323.6 3411.0 
Madhya Pradesh 4094.2 4770.8 
Maharashtra 19,018.6 22,009.2 
Manipur --- 18.0 
Meghalaya --- 30.1 
Mizoram --- 0.6 
Nagaland --- 42.9 
Orissa 860.6 1085.2 
Punjab 3498.2 4240.6 
Rajasthan 2701.2 4367.3 
Sikkim --- 5.0 
Tamil Nadu 9969.7 9102.6 
Tripura --- 59.4 
Uttar Pradesh 9261.1 12,697.6 
Uttaranchal --- 424.0 
West Bengal 3346.8 4740.1 
Total, All States 100,782.3 96,747.0 
Sources: For non-judicial stamp duties, data collected by the National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy from State budgets; for stamp duties and registration fees, data collected from the 
Reserve Bank of India. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
and registration fees was gathered from Reserve Bank of India sources.  I am grateful to Tapas Sen of the National 
Institute of Public Finance and Policy for providing this information. 
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Table 8. Average (1996-1997 to 2000-2001) Own Revenue Shares of Revenue Components, Selected Indian States 
(shares expressed in percentages) 
 
Revenue Source 
 
Bihar 
 
Haryana 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
 
Rajasthan 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
 
All States 
States Own Revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100 
    States Own Tax Revenue 71.87 66.03 70.98 73.06 84.12 77.70 
         Agricultural Income Tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 
         Professions Tax 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.00 0.07a    1.01 
         Land Revenue 0.81 0.50 0.40 0.70 0.82 1.06 
         Stamps and Registration Fees 7.33 4.92 5.64 6.41 11.34 6.68 
         Urban Immovable Property Fax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.01 0.06 
         Sales Taxb 47.18 30.84 31.76 38.29 46.45 46.90 
         State Excise Taxes 7.44 14.60 13.26 17.30 17.85 10.92 
         Taxes on Vehicles, Goods, and Passengers 6.63 10.68 10.75 6.90 5.04 6.39 
         Entertainment Tax 0.60 1.22 0.28 0.42 1.28 0.57 
    States Own Non-tax Revenue 28.13 33.97 29.02 26.94 15.88 22.30 
         Interest Receipts 4.05 9.72 3.55 11.96 4.72 6.98 
         Dividends and Profits 0.34 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.14 
         Social and Economic Services 20.63 18.87 23.62 10.55 8.65 10.12 
Memo Items 
States Own Revenue (as percent of Total Revenue) 39.9% 79.1% 60.2% 62.1% 50.2% 63.0% 
Revenue (as percent of GSDP) 15.3% 13.9% 13.1% 13.3% 11.8% 11.9% 
Own Revenue (as percent of GSDP) 6.1% 11.7% 7.9% 8.3% 5.9% 7.5% 
Per capita GSDP (in Rs.) Rs6905 Rs22,680 Rs11,905 Rs13,329 Rs10,192 Rs.17,658 
a Professions tax collection in Uttar Pradesh consists of recovery of arrears. 
b This includes Central Sales Tax, Sales Tax on Motor Spirits, and Entry Taxes. 
Source: Calculated from Table 1 in Uttar Pradesh Policy Notes (2002), “UP's Own Revenue System: Assessment and Reform Suggestions”.
 
Table 9. Revenue and Revenue Components per Capita, 2000-2001, Selected Indian States (in Rs.) 
 
 
State 
 
Per Capita GSDP in 
2000-01 
 
Own 
Revenues 
 
Own Tax 
Revenues 
 
Own Non-tax 
Revenues 
Own Non-Tax 
Revenues less 
Interest Receipts
 
 
Sales Taxa 
 
 
State Excisea 
Motor Vehicles, 
Goods and 
Passenger Taxesa 
Stamp Duties 
and Registration 
Feesa 
Bihar 7867 569 387 182 149 252 (65.1) 45 (11.6) 33 (8.5) 40 (10.3) 
Orissa 10,099 881 644 237 230 366 (56.8) 61 (9.5) 102 (15.8) 39 (6.1) 
Uttar Pradesh 11,705 776 665 111 86 369 (55.5) 145 (21.8) 42 (6.3) 85 (12.8) 
Madhya Pradesh 13,738 1069 804 266 114 372 (46.3) 151 (18.8) 118 (14.7) 66 (8.2) 
Rajasthan 15,483 1441 1077 364 207 587 (54.5) 229 (21.3) 104 (9.7) 94 (8.7) 
West Bengal 18,106 959 857 102 87 540 (63.0) 64 (7.5) 28 (3.3) 64 (7.5) 
Andhra Pradesh 19,505 1807 1415 392 186 948 (67.0) 184 (13.0) 132 (9.3) 86 (6.1) 
Karnataka 20,764 2051 1746 305 176 1032 (59.1) 267 (15.3) 190 (10.9) 150 (8.6) 
Tamil Nadu 22,128 2249 2015 234 180 1292 (64.1) 347 (17.2) 147 (7.3) 153 (7.6) 
Kerala 23,018 2243 1986 256 231 1393 (70.1) 248 (12.5) 142 (7.2) 145 (7.3) 
Gujarat 23,087 2783 2148 635 291 1294 (60.2) 6 (0.3) 251 (11.7) 123 (5.7) 
Haryana 23,279 2756 2081 675 546 1102 (53.0) 517 (24.8) 222 (10.7) 203 (9.8) 
Maharashtra 26,893 2519 2114 406 374 1313 (62.1) 196 (9.3) 121 (5.7) 229 (10.8) 
Punjab 28,177 2755 1637 1118 929 918 (56.1) 424 (25.9) 107 (6.5) 138 (8.4) 
Average 19,643 b 1776 1398 377 270 841 (60.2) 206 (14.7) 124 (8.9) 115 (8.2) 
a The number in parentheses is the percent of the specified tax in total Own Tax Revenues. 
b Average per capita GDP for all States is measured at factor cost for the year 2000-01.  
Source: Calculated from Table 7 in Uttar Pradesh Policy Notes (2002), “UP's Own Revenue System: Assessment and Reform Suggestions”. 
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 These revenues have grown fairly steadily over time.  Table 10 presents estimates of  the 
“buoyancy” of specific revenue sources for selected States, where the “buoyancy” is defined as 
the percentage change in revenues divided by the percentage change in gross State product 
(without controlling for any structural changes in the revenue sources) and is estimated using 
simple regression methods.  With some exceptions, many of these buoyancy estimates 
approximate unity.  The highest average buoyancy (or 1.15) is for stamp duties and registration 
fees. 
 
 
Table 10. Estimated Buoyancies of Own Revenues and its Components, 1980-1981 to 2000-2001 
 
 
State 
 
Own 
Revenues 
Own 
Tax 
Revenues 
Own 
Non-tax 
Revenues 
Own Non-Tax 
Revenues less 
Interest Receipts
 
Sales 
Tax 
 
State 
Excise 
Motor Vehicles, 
Goods, and 
Passenger Taxes 
Stamp Duties 
and Registration 
Fees 
Bihar 0.98 1.04 0.83 0.24a 1.02 1.17 1.15 1.33 
Orissa 1.05 1.13 0.90 1.02 1.20 1.12 1.23 1.07 
Uttar Pradesh  0.99 1.04 0.79 0.82 1.11 1.23 0.76 1.12 
Madhya Pradesh 0.92 0.99 0.78 0.67 0.92 1.11 1.00 1.16 
Rajasthan 0.96 1.01 0.86 0.79 0.96 1.34 0.88 1.26 
West Bengal 0.90 0.94 0.64 0.75 0.98 0.89 0.38 1.09 
Andhra Pradesh 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.81 1.06 0.62 0.96 1.04 
Karnataka 0.97 1.03 0.77 0.82 1.08 0.92 1.00 1.25 
Tamil Nadu 0.96 0.99 0.79 0.79 0.99 0.97 0.92 1.05 
Kerala 0.96 1.02 0.65 0.82 1.08 0.87 1.07 1.06 
Gujarat 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.90 1.04 0.81 0.88 1.13 
Haryana 1.06 0.98 1.11 1.24 1.08 0.80 0.86 1.09 
Maharashtra 0.91 0.96 0.77 0.61 0.97 1.05 0.86 1.47 
Punjab 1.07 0.95 1.35 1.55 0.99 1.03 0.78 0.90 
Average 0.98 1.00 0.86 0.89 1.03 1.00 0.91 1.15 
a This estimated buoyancy is statistically significant at the 78 percent level only.  All other estimates are statistically significant at the 
98 percent level or higher. 
Source: From Table 6 in Uttar Pradesh Policy Notes (2002), “UP's Own Revenue System: Assessment and Reform Suggestions”. 
 
 
Figures 1 to 11 show the trends in real per capita revenues for selected States since 1980-
1981, where real revenues are deflated by the GDP deflator.  Over this period of time, real non-
judicial stamp duties grew on average by 24.0 percent per year.  States with above-average 
annual growth in real revenues include Maharashtra (63.4 percent), Karnataka (30.4 percent), 
Haryana (26.1 percent), Uttar Pradesh (25.5 percent), Rajasthan (24.2 percent), and Madhya 
Pradesh (24.1 percent).  In no State was the average annual growth in real revenues less than 
12.0 percent.  In this regard, the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995) estimates 
that the overall buoyancy and elasticity coefficients for selected States over the decade of the 
1980s were well in excess of 1 (or 1.23 and 1.12, respectively).29 
 
As illustrated in Figures 1 to 11, revenues grew steadily in nearly all States over the 
entire period.  Simple linear trend lines fit for each State indicate a clear upward trend, for each 
State and for each measure of revenues, even for real per capita revenues.  Discussions with 
government officials indicate that several States, such as West Bengal and Maharashtra, have 
                                                 
29  See National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995), Economic Reforms and the Stamp Act (New Delhi, 
India). 
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reduced stamp duty rates in recent years.  As can be seen from the trends in collections in these 
States, there is a strong positive trend over time, suggesting that revenues may in fact increase 
with rate reductions.  In addition, the stamp duty rate in Rajasthan was lowered from 12 percent 
to 7 percent in 1996-1997, and the World Bank (2000) documents that revenues increased by 36 
percent between 1996-1997 and 1998-1999.30  Further evidence that a reduction in stamp duty 
rates may actually lead to an increase in revenues is found by Das-Gupta (2002), who calculates 
for Karnataka a negative correlation between the growth rates of the effective tax rate and the 
average transaction value per document; that is, he finds that a 1 percent increase in the growth 
rate of the effective tax rate is associated with a -0.6 percent decrease in the average transaction 
value.31  Although any conclusions must remain tentative at this time, it is certainly possible that 
stamp duties are so restrictive that States may not have much revenues to lose – and may in fact 
have much to gain – from a significant reduction in stamp duty rates.  This issue is examined in 
more detail later. 
 
 
B. Stamp Duty Revenue Losses from Undervaluation  
 
As discussed earlier, it is widely believed that the high rates of stamp duties lead to 
significant undervaluations of the transactions.  Such undervaluations lead directly to stamp duty 
revenue losses.  To illustrate the magnitudes of these losses, consider a “representative” 
transaction, in which a property with true value of Rs. 1 million is exchanged.  Suppose also that 
the individual understates the true value by various percentages: 10 percent, 25 percent, and 50 
percent.  The stamp duty revenue loss then depends upon the duty rate.  The simple calculations 
in Table 11 indicate the magnitude of the revenue loss for different duty rates. 
 
 
Table 11. Stamp Duty Revenue Loss for “Representative” Rs. 1 Million Transaction 
(in Rs.) 
Percent Undervaluation  
Duty Rate 10% 25% 50% 
5% 5000 12,500 25,000 
10% 10,000 25,000 50,000 
15% 15,000 37,500 75,000 
20% 20,000 50,000 100,000 
25% 25,000 62,500 125,000 
 
 
 The potential impact on stamp duties in selected States can also be calculated.  Assume 
that undervaluation is, say, 25 percent for all transactions.  Table 12 shows the stamp duty 
                                                 
30  See the World Bank (2000), "Rajasthan: Averting Fiscal Crisis and Accelerating Growth", Draft Report, Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia Region (Washington, D.C.). 
31  See Arindam Das-Gupta (2002), “The Stamps and Registration Department in Karnataka: A Review of 
Institutions and Administration”, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (Mumbai, India). 
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revenue loss.32   These losses are of course only suggestive, but they indicate that undervaluation 
of transaction value has a major impact on stamp duty collections.  These estimates are also 
likely to be underestimates of the true revenue loss because they do not consider the possibility 
that many transactions may simply go unreported.  They also do not consider the use of 
fraudulent stamps in transactions.  According to government officials, forged stamps cost State 
governments as much as Rs. 100,000 million in lost revenues in 2000-2001, or roughly the 
amount of non-judicial stamp duties actually collected. 
 
 
Table 12. Lost Stamp Duty Revenues, 2000-2001 (in Rs. millions) 
 
State 
 
Actual Stamp Duties 
Stamp Duty Revenue Loss from  
25 Percent Undervaluation 
Andhra Pradesh 7663.0 2554.3 
Assam 268.2 89.4 
Bihar 1366.9 455.6 
Goa 155.5 51.8 
Gujarat 4778.3 1592.8 
Haryana 3791.2 1263.7 
Karnataka 7078.1 2359.4 
Kerala 3323.6 1107.9 
Madhya Pradesh 4094.2 1364.7 
Maharashtra 19,018.6 6339.5 
Orissa 860.6 286.9 
Punjab 3498.2 1166.1 
Rajasthan 2701.2 900.4 
Tamil Nadu 9969.7 3323.2 
Uttar Pradesh 9261.1 3087.0 
West Bengal 3346.8 1115.6 
Total, All States 100,782.3 33,594.1 
 
C. Links to Other Taxes 
 
 Undervaluation of transactions for State government stamp duties and registration fees 
has a cascading effect on other taxes imposed by other levels of government.  The most 
important of these are to the central government individual income tax (via the taxation of capital 
gains) and to its wealth tax.  The local government property tax is also affected.  There may be a 
more indirect link to State government sales and central excise taxes. 
 
 Individual Income Tax.  An individual who sells property for a higher price than its 
purchase price realizes a capital gain.  Under the individual income tax, the incremental value 
(less deductions for costs of improvement and for expenditures on the transfer and indexed for 
the year of acquisition) is subject to the capital gains tax in the individual income tax.  At the 
same time, the total value of the transaction is subject to stamp duties.  The bases of the two 
taxes are therefore related, and more accurate assessment of one would improve the collection of 
                                                 
32  Actual revenues R equal the stamp duty rate t times the reported value of the transactions VR, while potential 
revenues P equal t times the true value VT.  Since VR = (1-s)VT where s is the fraction underreported, then potential 
revenues equal R/(1-s). 
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the other.  Unfortunately, the administrative links between the two taxes are virtually non-
existent, so that the widespread undervaluation of transactions subject to stamp duties is likely to 
have significant effects on capital gains revenues. 
 
 There is little information on the magnitude of capital gains collections or the individuals 
who pay the tax.  Nevertheless, it is possible to make some approximate estimates of the capital 
gains revenue loss due to undervaluation of stamp duty transactions, using the same basic 
approach as earlier.  Consider again a “representative” transaction, in which a property with true 
value of Rs. 1 million is exchanged.  Suppose that the property has been held longer than 3 years, 
so that it is subject to the long-term capital gains tax rate in the individual income tax of 20 
percent.  Suppose also that the individual understates the true value by various percentages: 10 
percent, 25 percent, and 50 percent.  The stamp duty revenue loss is indicated in Table 11; the 
capital gains revenue loss can be similarly estimated because, other things equal, it is only the 
extent of undervaluation of the final transaction that affects the capital gains collections.  The 
simple calculations in Table 13 indicate the magnitude of the capital gains revenue loss for this 
representative transaction. 
 
Table 13. Capital Gains Revenue Loss for “Representative” Rs. 1 Million Transaction 
10% Undervaluation 25% Undervaluation 50% Undervaluation 
Rs. 20,000 Rs. 50,000 Rs. 100,000 
 
The potential impact on total capital gains collections can also be calculated under 
various assumptions.  Recall that for all States (non-judicial) stamp duties collections in 2000-
2001 totaled Rs. 100,782.3 million.  Assume that the average tax rate applied to these 
transactions in the different States was 15 percent, so that the total declared value is Rs. 
671,882.0 million.  Assume also that the fraction of these transactions subject to the capital gains 
tax ranges from 25 percent to 100 percent.  Then, under different assumptions about the extent of 
undervaluation, the lost capital gains revenues can be calculated.  These losses are shown in 
Table 14.33  As before, these losses are only suggestive, but they indicate that undervaluation of 
transaction value has a major impact that cascades beyond its effect on stamp duty collections.  
They are also likely to considerably underestimate the true revenue loss.  An implicit assumption 
in the calculations is that capital gains taxes are paid on the reported value of the transaction; 
however, it is unlikely that these transactions are actually declared for capital gains taxation.  If 
these transactions are not in fact reported for capital gains taxes, then the revenue loss is even 
greater. 
 
Table 14. Foregone Capital Gains Revenues, 2000-01 (in Rs. millions) 
Percent of Base Subject to Capital Gains Tax Percent 
Undervaluation 25% 50% 75% 100% 
10% 3732.7 7465.4 11,198.0 14930.7 
25% 11,198.0 22,396.1 33,594.1 44,792.1 
50% 33594.1 67,188.2 100,782.3 134,376.4 
                                                 
33  Recall that the reported value of the transactions VR and the true value VT are related by VR = (1-s)VT or VT = 
VR/(1-s), where s is the fraction underreported.  Capital gains revenues equal the tax rate (20 percent) times the 
amount of this base subject to the tax. 
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Remember that it is the central government that would reap the benefits of improved 
valuation of transactions in the stamp duties, while it is the State governments that would be 
responsible for any such improved valuations.  The gift and wealth taxes are also central 
government taxes whose revenues would increase if valuation of transactions subject to stamp 
duties improved.  At present these taxes are a very minor source of central government revenues. 
 
 Property Tax.  Local governments throughout India levy a property tax whose importance 
in local revenues varies considerably, typically generating between 10 and 20 percent of own-
source local revenues but sometimes reaching as much as 1/2 of own-source revenues.  Like 
most countries that have followed the British tradition of taxing property, the tax base is defined 
as the “annual rateable value” (ARV), or the annual rent that land and buildings might 
reasonably be expected to receive in an open market.  The existence of rent control and other 
local regulations considerably complicate the calculation of the ARV.  In part because of these 
complications, many local governments are now experimenting with a tax base based on the 
capital value of the property. 
 
 With a property tax based on the annual rental value of a property, there is no immediate 
link between values declared in stamp duty transactions and the base of the property tax.  
However, the annual rental value of a property should be closely related to its capital value, as 
revealed in the market sale of the property.  Some urban local bodies attempt to take advantage 
of this link by the use of market values in setting of “guidance values” for establishing annual 
rental values of different types of properties; as noted above, some local bodies are also 
exploring a change to a capital value property tax. 
 
 A major problem in property tax administration is undervaluation of properties.  Such 
undervaluation is clearly linked, at least in principle, to undervaluation of transactions in the 
stamp duties.  Undervaluation leads directly to lower revenues, and also over time to lower 
buoyancy of revenues.  As with the link between stamp duties and the capital gains tax, any 
improvement in valuation for stamp duties would likely lead over time to an increase in 
collections of the property tax, and would also improve the ability of the property tax to capture 
increases in property valuations over time. .  Indeed, the linkage between improvements in stamp 
duties and subsequent improvements in the property tax is likely to be quite strong. Moreover, in 
many jurisdictions, a reassessment for property tax purposes is only triggered by a sale 
transaction. Thus, there is a strong disincentive either to avoid transactions or undervalue them to 
avoid property tax as well as stamp duties, and a reform aimed at reducing tax avoidance must 
take into account the joint impact of these taxes on real estate transactions. 
 
It is possible to make some approximate estimates of the property tax revenue loss due to 
undervaluation of stamp duty transactions, using the same basic approach as earlier.  Aggregate 
State stamp duties collections in 2000-01totaled Rs. 100,782.3 million, and, assuming that the 
average tax rate applied to these transactions in the different States was 15 percent, the total 
declared value is Rs. 671,882.0 million.  Now suppose that the fraction of these transactions that 
represent immovable property subject to the property tax ranges from 25 percent to 100 percent.  
Importantly, suppose that these transactions are subject to different amounts of stamp duty 
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undervaluation that also leads to property tax undervaluation.  With an average tax rate on capital 
value of 2 percent, the aggregate amount of lost property taxes can be calculated.  These losses 
are shown in Table 1534.  These estimates are meant only as broadly suggestive of the aggregate 
revenue losses that might be present.   They again indicate that undervaluation of transaction 
value has a major impact that cascades beyond its effect on stamp duty collections. 
 
 
Table 15. Foregone Property Tax Collections, 2000-2001 (in Rs. Millions) 
Percent of Base Subject to Property Tax Percent 
Undervaluation 25% 50% 75% 100% 
10% 373.3 746.5 1119.8 1493.1 
25% 1119.8 2239.6 3359.4 4479.2 
50% 3359.4 6718.8 10,078.2 13,437.6 
 
 
As with the capital gains tax, State government attempts to improve valuation for stamp 
duties generates benefits for a different level of government, in this case, urban governments that 
impose the property tax. 
 
 State Sales and Central Excise Taxes.  A less direct link may be between stamp duties 
and State sales and central excise taxes.  Suppose that the existence of high stamp duties lead 
companies operating in the real estate sector, especially builders, to undervalue properties.  Such 
undervaluation saves the company tax payments, thereby increasing company revenues.  
However, these increased revenues are illegally generated, sometimes referred to as “black 
money”.  In order to avoid revealing the existence of this black money, the company must utilize 
it in ways that maintain secrecy; that is, the company cannot use it to pay, say, sales taxes on 
inputs or excise taxes because these transactions must stay off official company records.  As a 
result, there emerges a cascading effect through the entire production process, as activities must 
remain hidden.  Put differently, the underreporting incentive in stamp duties feeds the “black 
economy” by driving money and resources into the sector.35  In many scenarios, the revenue 
effects of this resource movement can be quite significant. 
 
To illustrate, consider a stylized economy that is divided into two sectors: a taxed sector 
and a “black economy” sector that is legally subject to taxation but that escapes taxation because 
activities there are hard-to-tax.  In response to a tax imposed on the taxed sector (e.g., stamp 
duties), resources move from the taxed sector to the black economy sector.  Under various 
assumptions about demand for each output (e.g., elasticities of product demand), about 
production conditions for each output (e.g., factor proportions, elasticities of substitution), and 
about sectoral size, it is possible to simulate the impact of a change in taxation on tax collections.  
In this stylized model, it is easy to generate settings in which the movement of resources from 
the taxed sector to the black economy sector reach as much as 25 to 50 percent of the initial 
                                                 
34  Recall that the reported value of the transactions VR and the true value VT are related by VR = (1-s)VT or VT = 
VR/(1-s), where s is the fraction underreported.  Capital gains revenues equal the tax rate (20 percent) times the 
amount of this base subject to the tax. 
35  The authors are grateful to Dr. Vijay Kelkar of the Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs for helpful 
discussions on this issue. 
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taxed sector size, with an implied revenue loss of corresponding amounts.36  The next subsection 
explores the implications of the “black economy” in more detail. 
 
 
D. The “Black Economy” Effect 
 
Having looked at the pathways by which underdeclaration of property values for the 
purpose of stamp duty evasion may affect individual taxes such as capital gains, in this 
subsection we discuss a broader impact of stamp tax evasion through its effect on the circulation 
of black money.  It is widely believed that, given the high levels of stamp duty rates, many 
immovable property sales transactions are deferred, others are not recorded, and even those 
transactions that do pass through the formalities of the registration of the change of title are 
recorded at values less than the full consideration paid for the property.  As this underdeclaration 
occurs, individuals involved in the transaction must pay a part of the consideration in “black 
money”; that is, they must pay in cash and in such a way that the consideration paid is not 
recorded as part of the transaction, be it for the buyer or for the seller. 
 
The underdeclared value of the property must be paid in cash, and the seller is in 
possession of black money that is unlikely to be whitened as long as continued operations in the 
black economy are possible and desirable.  Indeed, the most frequent recipient of these funds 
would be property developers who have strong incentives to continue to circulate this black 
money in the black economy.  As this money continues to circulate, a whole host of other 
transactions take place in the black economy and continue to escape the tax net.  Payments to 
materials suppliers could be made in cash, thus evading sales and excise taxes.  Builders paid in 
black money would not declare the associated profits for income tax purposes.  Moreover, these 
recipients of the black money would then have the wherewithal and the incentive to make their 
purchases of goods and services in the black economy, thereby continuing the circular flow of 
transactions that escape the tax net.  As a result, not only are stamp duty revenues eroded by 
underdeclaration, all tax yields are eroded as the process feeds black money in circulation and 
provides outlets for black money, whatever its source, thereby increasing opportunities for tax 
evasion of all kinds.  Central government as well as state government revenues suffer. 
 
Table 16 shows the distribution of all tax revenues by level of government, and suggests 
the possible incidence of the secondary impacts of underdeclaration of real estate values as black 
money works its way through the economy.  These indications are only a rough approximation 
because it is certain taxes may be more affected by evasion than others, but such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Nonetheless, it is important to note that, insofar as high stamp 
duty rates encourage underdeclaration of property values, tax revenues from multiple sources 
suffer, from stamp duties to federal excises to local body property taxes and business income. 
These numbers indicate that the central government stands to lose about 62 percent of every one 
rupee of these additional tax leakages, of which about 17 percent would be shared with the 
States.  
 
                                                 
36  For examples of such calculations, see James Alm (1985), “The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy”, 
Economic Inquiry, 24 (2), 243-263; and James Alm and Robert Buckley (1998), “Are Government Revenues from 
Financial Repression Worth the Costs?” Public Finance Review, (26 (3), 187-213. 
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Table 16. Distribution of Center and State Tax Revenues 
 FY 2000/2001 FY 2001/2002 
Percent of Total Revenues 
   Center Own 45% 46% 
   Center Devolved 17% 16% 
   State Own 39% 38% 
   Total 100% 100% 
 
Total Revenues as Percent of GDP 16% 17% 
         Source: Economic Review 2002-2003, Tables 2.10-2.11. 
 
 
We can consider a rough order of magnitude estimate of the impacts of underdeclaration 
of property values using the following simple model normalized for one rupee of actual real 
estate transaction.  Define λU as the percent of underdeclaration of real estate values and t as the 
stamp duty rate.  Then the amount of stamp duty collected per rupee of actual real estate 
transactions equals (1- λU ) t.  Also, define λU as the amount of money that is circulated in the 
black economy.  In principle, we can trace the impact of this injection of money into the black 
economy through a money demand equation, or  
 
MBVB = PBYB 
 
where 
 
MB = the supply of black money 
 
VB = the velocity of black money 
 
PB = the price level 
 
YB = the real income added to the black economy. 
 
Normalizing  PB to 1 and substituting for  λU, we get YB=  λU*VB.  Now let γT equal the ratio of 
total tax collections to GDP.  Then the total tax revenue lost on this additional black income 
equals (γT * λU * VB).  It is possible to calculate the total tax revenue lost under different 
assumptions about the values of these parameters. 
 
Table 17 provides us with the most recent values for γT.   For this illustrative calculation, 
we use the historical average round number of 15.  Estimates of the velocity of black money are 
difficult to come by for the obvious reason that market participants make every effort to avoid 
disclosure of these values to official sources. Establishing a robust empirical relationship 
between the two is even more daunting.  However, for the sake of discussion, the velocity of 
currency in circulation may be used as a proxy initial value.  Over the last thirty years, this value 
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has hovered around 10 to 11.37  Likewise the value of λU, or the underdeclaration factor, is 
difficult to know with certainty.  However, market participants suggest that 25 percent is not an 
unreasonable estimate, and many would argue that 50 percent is closer to the mark.  
 
Substituting the lower of these values into (γT * λU * VB) indicates that, for every 1 rupee 
in total real estate transactions, 37.5 percent of the tax is lost due to the infusion to the black 
economy.  If the stamp tax rate is 12.5 percent, then a total of 9.4 percent in stamp duty revenues 
is actually collected in the transaction.  Therefore, using these illustrative figures, the taxes lost 
due to the black economy effect are four times the actual revenues earned from stamp duties.  
 
This substantial leveraging effect occurs for two reasons.  First, the “blackening” of 
money to complete the real estate transactions gives rise to a range of other “black” transactions 
that also escape the tax net.  Second, the underdeclared value goes rupee for rupee into the black 
economy, while only a fraction of the declared value is paid to the tax authorities.38 
 
This result is important because it suggests that if, underdeclaration can be reduced via a 
reduction of stamp duty rate, whether or not stamp duty yields themselves improve with a Laffer 
curve effect, other fiscal benefits may accrue as one of the sources of funds to the black economy 
is constricted.  Indeed, even if stamp duty collections decline with a significant rate reduction, 
overall tax collections may improve. 
 
Clearly, one can question the values used for the parameters in the illustrative calculation, 
since robust empirical estimates cannot be obtained readily.  Thus, we have prepared in Table 17 
a sensitivity analysis varying the two key parameters for this calculation: the velocity of black 
currency in circulation and the percentage underdeclaration of property transaction values.  We 
show this sensitivity analysis for two different illustrative stamp tax rates: 15 percent and 10 
percent. 
 
 
Table 17. Ratio of  Lost Revenues due to Black Economy Effect to Stamp Tax Collections 
Stamp Duty tRE = 15% Stamp Duty tRE = 10% 
         λU        
VB 
10% 25% 50%      λU       
VB 
10% 25% 50% 
 2 0.2 0.7  2  2 0.3 0.7 3 
 5 0.6 1.7  5  5 0.8 1.7 7.5 
10 1.1 3.3 10 10 1.7 3.3 15 
15 1.7  5 15 15 2.5 7.5 22.5 
 
 
These scenarios indicate that, under a wide range of assumptions, it is plausible that the 
tax revenues recovered from reducing the black economy effects of underdeclaration of real 
                                                 
37  See the Revenue Bank of India, Bulletin of Statistics, various issues. 
38  We relax this strong assumption below.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that a fraction of the undeclared 
value larger than the 10 to 15 percent stamp duty rates in effect is likely to seep into the black economy. 
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estate values could more than compensate for the loss of stamp duties due to a substantial 
reduction in rates.  Only in those scenarios that are shaded would the black economy tax effect 
be less than total stamp tax collections.  
 
Within this broad range of scenarios, it is possible to assess which parameter values are 
the more plausible by relating these computations to other estimates of the percentage of GDP in 
the “black” economy.  One can work backward through the basic equations to compute the total 
value of black GDP driven by underdeclaration in real estate.  The share of stamp duties in GDP 
is roughly 0.5 percent.39  If the velocity of black money is 5, underdeclaration is 40 percent, and 
the stamp tax rate is 10 percent40, then the implied black economy share of GDP from real estate 
is about 17 percent.  Recent estimates show about 23 percent of GDP is in the black economy in 
India.41  Earlier work by Acharya et al. (1986) on the black economy suggests a figure of about 
18 to 21 percent for 1980-1981.42  Together these figures strongly suggest that the parameter 
values we have chosen are not outside the bounds of plausibility.  
 
 
E. Stamp Duty Rates and Revenue Performance: Evidence for a Link Between 
Undervaluation and Stamp Duty Rates 
 
A critical assumption underlying the above scenarios is that underdeclaration of property 
values is sensitive to the stamp duty rate; that is, if duty rates are lowered, then there will be less 
tendency to underdeclare property transaction values to evade high stamp duties, and accordingly 
the flow of money into the black economy will decline.  This is commonly thought to be the case 
in India. 
 
We sought further empirical support for this intuitively plausible assumption by 
analyzing the behavior of stamp duty revenues in response to changes in tax rates.43  This 
indirect method was chosen because it is difficult to observe underdeclaration directly given that 
this is an illegal activity.  If property undervaluation is common and sensitive to tax rates, we 
would expect it to affect the relationship between changes in tax rates and revenues over time. It 
should be emphasized that we are not testing the hypothesis that there is a Laffer curve effect for 
stamp duties collections: if a Laffer curve effect were in evidence for stamp duties, then 
underdeclaration would decline sufficiently to generate increased revenues from stamp duties 
themselves.  Here we are only looking for evidence that underdeclaration declines when stamp 
duty rates decline from the levels currently in place in India. As the simulations above show, 
plausible parameter values suggest that, even if there is a reduction in stamp duty revenues when 
rates decline, additional revenues from other taxes may be generated by staunching the flow of 
money to the black economy. 
 
                                                 
39 See Indian Public Finance Statistics 2001-2002, Table 1.2  
40 The weighted average stamp tax rate for the sixteen major states is 9.7 percent as of 2001. 
41 See Friedrich Schneider (2002), “Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries Around the 
World”, paper presented at the Workshop of the Australian Tax Centre, ANU, Canberra, Australia, July 17, 2002.  
42  See Shankar Acharya et al. (1986), Aspects of the Black Economy in India, National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy (New Delhi, India). 
43 For this purpose, we used a time series of non-judicial stamp tax revenues in selected States kindly provided by 
Mr. Tapas Sen of the NIPFP. 
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If underdeclaration does not respond at all to changes in tax rates, then revenues would 
rise or fall based entirely on the change in the tax rate; that is, a given percent change in the tax 
rate would give rise to a proportional change in stamp duty revenues.  We examined historical 
data to test whether this hypothesis holds.  Annex II provides a time series of historical stamp tax 
rates covering FY1980-1981 to FY2003-2004, collated for the purpose of this paper. Ideally, 
regression analysis could be used to test such a hypothesis.  However, as perusal of Annex II 
shows, stamp duty rates, with the exception of West Bengal, have not changed often enough to 
get reliable estimates of regression coefficients for individual States.44   Our analysis compared 
changes in stamp duty rates to revenue changes over the period in eleven major Indian States 
where duty rates have changed, as shown in Figures 1 to 11.  Recall that Figures 1 to 11 show the 
trend analysis on a State by State basis.  The pattern that emerges is quite clear: reductions in 
rates rarely result in a proportional decline in revenues.  Indeed in several cases, revenues 
actually increase in response to a rate change.  Likewise, rate increases (except in Kerala) tend to 
result in less than proportional revenue improvement, again indicating that underdeclaration 
tends to rise with rate increases.  Figure 12 assembles all the instances of rate changes and 
associated revenue changes.  All other factors held equal, if underdeclaration does not respond to 
tax rate changes, then we would expect these observations to be close to a 45-degree line, as a 
given percentage change in the tax rate feeds into a similar increase in taxes.  However, the fitted 
line shows a slightly negative relationship between rate changes and revenue changes, although 
clearly there is a good deal of variability that is not explained by the rate changes alone.  In 
statistical terms, the slope of the line is not significantly different from zero (the confidence level 
is about 65 percent).  (See Annex III for the regression results and Annex IV for the analysis of a 
single state, West Bengal.)  This result suggests strongly that other factors such as shifts in 
underdeclaration of property values are at play.45 
 
In Figures 13 to 16, we examine the impact of tax rates changes for a few States for 
which we have more data.  Stamp tax revenues are a function of rates, property values 
transacted, and the number of transactions, or R = t * PRE * N, where R is stamp duty revenues, t 
is the stamp duty rate, PRE is the average price of real estate transacted in the period, and N is the 
number of transactions in a given period.  Differentiating this expression gives: 
 
∧∧∧∧ ++= NPt RER  , 
 
where ^ indicates a proportional change.  Using this relationship, we can create a predicted value 
of revenue changes in a given period based on changes in the determinants of revenues.   Note 
that this is not a behavioral equation against which hypotheses would be tested, but rather it is an 
identity. 
 
Now if we were could observe all of these variables directly, then we could simply 
substitute the right hand side variables to get a predicted 
∧
R .  We do have information on some, 
                                                 
44 For West Bengal, a time series analysis from 1992-93-2000-2001 provides a significant and negative coefficient 
for the quadratic term on the tax rate, demonstrating a Laffer curve effect, in spite of very low degrees of freedom 
due to data limitations. Annex III shows the results of this analysis. 
45  These findings are consistent with those of Das Gupta (2002) on Karnataka. He found that a 1 percent increase in 
the effective tax rate led to a 0.6 percent decrease in revenues for the period 1980-1981 to 1997-1998. 
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but not all, of these variables.  Revenues are non-judicial stamp tax revenues as before, and the 
tax rate changes are computed from the information in Annex II.  We do not have detailed State 
by State data for the number of immovable property transactions recorded in the Registrar’s 
office and hence subject to stamp tax.  Instead of actual declared values for the immovable 
property transactions, we use real estate price changes based on data provided by the Housing 
Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) for commercial and residential real estate prices in 
Mumbai, Calcutta, Bangalore, and Chennai.  These price data are based on the sales price of new 
developments checked against a buildup of developer costs, and are not based on values declared 
to the registrar for payment of stamp duty.  As such, we would not expect them to be directly 
affected by underdeclaration.  From the price data per square foot for a variety of different 
properties, we create an average index price and observed percentage changes in the index for 
each city.  There are no data recording the number of real estate transactions and subsequent 
registrations, and there are no state level data on GDP in the construction sector.  We use real 
GDP growth as a very rough proxy, in order to capture changes in transaction levels. 
 
Figures 13 to 16 suggest that run ups in property values drive stamp tax revenues, just as 
expected. Analyzing those time periods in which tax rates decline, we also note that predicted 
revenues tend to decline much more than actual revenues, even when property values shifts are 
taken into account. Likewise, in the case of duty rate increases, we find that the predicted growth 
in revenues is consistently higher than the actual. While the available data are not detailed 
enough to provide conclusive hypothesis testing, the evidence is broadly consistent with the 
commonly held view that underdeclaration responds to shifts in the stamp duty rate.  This pattern 
reinforces our earlier finding on the relationship between shifts in tax rates and the resulting 
growth in revenues.  Together this evidence strongly suggests that underdeclaration responds to 
duty rates. 
 
 
F. The Impacts of Tax Reform 
 
A likely reform scenario is one in which the stamp tax is lowered to a level closer to 
international practice.  The evidence that we have indicates that this would reduce 
underdeclaration and hence black economy effects.  Depending on the rate selected, actual stamp 
tax revenues could also increase; even if revenues declined, this analysis shows that overall tax 
revenues are likely to go up by more than the stamp duty revenues lost.  For example, if reducing 
the stamp duty rate from 10 percent to 5 percent were to lead to a decline in underdeclaration 
from 25 percent of value to 10 percent of value, then total tax take would increase by over 60 
percent, assuming a black money velocity of 5.  This occurs even though there is a 37 percent 
reduction in the stamp tax revenues.  These results could only be expected to improve as tax 
reform expands the ratio of tax to GDP, thereby enhancing the rewards of reducing leakage into 
the black economy, and as better tax administration reduces the scope for underdeclaration.  
Consequently, the main message arising from these results is that overall tax collections are quite 
likely to improve if stamp duty rates decline.  State governments may or may not lose some 
revenues from stamp taxes, but government as a whole is likely to gain from collection of other 
taxes. 
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VI. Conclusions: The Case for Stamp Duty Rate Reform 
 
By most criteria, stamp duties and registration fees are a “bad” tax.  They are very 
complicated, they are poorly administered, they highly distort economic decisions, especially 
those in urban land markets, they raise some but relatively little revenues, and the failure to value 
transactions accurately for purposes of stamp duties has a clear negative impact on a wide range 
of related taxes.  Recall that in the aggregate the amount of stamp duties and registration fees 
collected in Indian States totals Rs. 132,588 million in revenues.  According to officials, the 
failure to value properties accurately for purposes of stamp duties together with use of fraudulent 
tax paper costs State governments an amount of revenues that approximates the amount actually 
collected.  Further, the failure to value properties accurately costs different levels of government 
tax revenues from income taxes, gift and wealth taxes, property taxes, and sales and excise taxes.  
In the aggregate, the amount of foregone revenues from these linked taxes is almost certain to far 
exceed the amount of stamp duties and registration fees actually collected, according to a number 
of estimates here. 
 
A major concern of the State governments is the impact of stamp duty rate reductions on 
collections.  There is a widespread fear that any reform of stamp duties that reduced duty rates 
would lead to a significant loss of revenues for State governments.  Such fear acts as a major 
deterrent to any attempt to reduce overall duty rates. The empirical analysis above suggests that 
these fears are not always well founded. Some rate reductions have been accompanied by 
improved revenue performance.  Taking into account the impacts on other taxes, rate reductions 
are likely to improve overall revenue performance.  Addressing the specific revenue concerns of 
the States may then become an issue of providing an appropriate intergovernmental transfer, if 
needed to compensate stamp duty losses.  It is also important for State governments to bear in 
mind that maintaining high stamp tax rates may be counterproductive, even for their own 
revenues.  Our estimates of the black economy effect suggest that State level revenues from other 
taxes may go up if high stamp duties – and the incentive for black transactions – are reduced. 
 
In this regard, it should be noted that stamp duties are commonly found throughout the 
world.  However, the level of these taxes is in most instances much lower than in India; typically, 
transfer tax rates are around 1 percent of the value of the transaction.  Further, the broad reform 
trends in other countries, with such diverse characteristics as the United Kingdom, Australia, 
New South Wales, Mauritius, Switzerland, Germany, China, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Colombia, are generally similar.  Basic reforms in many countries have focused on: 
 
• Exempting taxes on financial transactions 
 
• Reducing, and sometimes eliminating, the tax rate 
 
• Utilizing modern technology in the payment and collection of taxes 
 
• Linking the payment of taxes to specific sectoral expenditures. 
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Similar kinds of reforms are needed in India.46  In particular, some obvious reforms include the 
following: 
 
• Administration of collection offices needs to be improved. 
 
• Duty rates should be significantly lowered and the rate structure simplified. 
 
• The number of items subject to taxation needs to be reduced, especially financial 
transactions. 
 
• Valuation needs to be improved, and simple measures taken to detect fraud more 
effectively. 
 
• Enforcement needs to be improved, to reduce evasion and avoidance. 
 
• The process needs to be simplified for taxpayers. 
 
• The process needs to be modernized via attempts to introduce “e-Government”. 
 
Indeed, there is some indication that reform of the stamp duties along these lines is already 
underway, at least in some states.  For example, the stamp duty rate on property sales has been 
brought down in some states (including Rajasthan, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh)47.  Some states 
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh) have also completed or are in the 
process of strengthening their official valuation machinery.  Maharashtra and Karnataka are 
streamlining document registration procedures through automation or outsourcing, and 
Karnataka in 2003 was to abolish the use of stamp paper. 
 
In pursuing these reforms, there are obstacles that must be addressed.  First, stamp duties 
are a significant source of revenue for most State governments, and it is sometimes feared that a 
reduction in tax rates may cost the States revenues.  Our analysis suggests that this fear is likely 
overstated.  Even so, this consideration suggests that any rate reductions be phased in over time.  
Alternative revenue sources for the States should also be explored, such as increased motor 
vehicle taxes, increased excise taxes, increased user charges, or a State piggyback on existing 
central government taxes.  Second, if rate reductions lead to valuation increases, the benefits 
would be realized mainly by local governments via increased property taxes and by the central 
government via increased capital gains (and, possibly, wealth and gift taxes), while much of the 
cost would be felt by State governments.  As a result, there may be a need to adjust grant 
formulae, as well as to examine more fully linkages across different taxes and levels of 
government.  Third, improvements in valuation, administration, enforcement, and modernization 
are costly.  State governments should seek central government or donor support in making any 
                                                 
46  Some reforms are embedded in the “model” stamp act.  See National Institute of Urban Affairs (1999), Indian 
Stamp Act – Model Legislation  (New Delhi, India). 
47  Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tripura, Orissa and the union territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
and Chandigarh plan to reduce their stamp duty rates to at most 5 percent by the end of the Tenth Plan.  Similar 
commitments have been sought by the Centre from other states and union territories.  See “Rationalization of Stamp 
Duty In States”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Press Release, December 15, 2003.  
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improvements, and should also fully explore e-Government options that make use of modern 
technology.  
 
This modernization and updating of the stamp tax should propel a number of other 
benefits. Reducing stamp duties on real property transfer will help develop the mortgage market, 
ease labor mobility, facilitate the development of a secondary housing market, and thus increase 
the value of all homeowners’ property. Lower stamp duty rates would make housing more 
affordable to young and low income households. Considering that mortgages are often available 
for up to 85 percent of the value of a home, stamp duties currently account for nearly half of the 
cash requirement to purchase a home. Reducing the rate closer to international levels would 
bring millions of potential homeowners closer to their goal. Indeed some of these beneficial 
impacts of stamp duty reductions merit further study and research to understand the potential 
benefits of stamp duty reform. 
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Annex I: Stamp Duties and Property Transfer Taxes for Selected Countries 
Countries 
(States) 
Current System or Tax Rate Tax reform or other stamp tax 
changes/proposed, old 
system 
Public opinion or cases Sources 
Australia 
(New South 
Wales) 
Stamp Duty on Transfer of Real Property (Land) 
For contracts dated after 11 July 2002, New tax 
rate: 
Does not exceed $12,000 $1.00 for every $100 or 
part of $100  
Exceeds $12,000 but not $30,000 $120 plus $2.00 
for every $100 or part of $100 over $12,000  
Exceeds $30,000 but not $50,000 $480 plus $3.00 
for every $100 or part of $100 over $30,000  
Exceeds $50,000 but not $100,000 $1,080 plus 
$3.50 for every $100 or part of $100 over $50,000  
Exceeds $100,000 but not $200,000 $2,830 plus 
$4.00 for every $100 or part of $100 over $100,000  
Exceeds $200,000 but not $250,000 $6,830 plus 
$4.25 for every $100 or part of $100 over $200,000  
Exceeds $250,000 but not $300,000 $8,955 plus 
$4.75 for every $100 or part of $100 over $250,000  
Exceeds $300,000 but not $500,000 $11,330 plus 
$5.00 for every $100 or part of $100 over $300,000  
Exceeds $500,000  $21,330 plus $5.50 for every 
$100 or part of $100 over $500,000 5) 
 
Motor Vehicle Stamp Duty:  
Rate is  3% of MV first $45,000, 5% of MV above 
$45,000 6) 
5 November 2003 
The NSW government has 
proposed a price cap of 
$350,000 on some state-built 
homes and cuts to stamp duty 
as part of a scheme to make 
Sydney housing more 
affordable.2) 
Stamp Duty on Transfer of 
Real Property (Land) 
For contracts dated prior 11 
July 2002, Old tax rate: 
Does not exceed $12,000 $1.00 
for every $100 or part of $100  
Exceeds $12,000 but not 
$30,000 $120 plus $2.00 for 
every $100 or part of $100 over 
$12,000  
Exceeds $30,000 but not 
$50,000 $480 plus $3.00 for 
every $100 or part of $100 over 
$30,000  
Exceeds $50,000 but not 
$100,000 $1,080 plus $3.50 for 
every $100 or part of $100 over 
$50,000  
Exceeds $100,000 but not 
$500,000 $2,830 plus $4.00 for 
every $100 or part of $100 over 
$100,000  
Exceeds $500,000 but not 
$1,000,000 $18,830 plus $4.50 
for every $100 or part of $100 
over $500,000  
Exceeds $1,000,000 $41,330 
plus $5.00 for every $100 or 
part of $100 over $1,000,000 5) 
Opinion on Current System 
29 October 2003 
Bombala Shire mayor Faye 
Campbell has echoed concerns 
about the impact of stamp duty 
on the regional property market. 
Deputy Prime Minister John 
Anderson says the state tax is 
causing a crisis in the regional 
market where house prices are 
rising faster than in Sydney.  
Councilor Campbell says she is 
concerned that, if properties 
continue to rise, young people 
will not be able to afford to buy in 
the shire.  "It makes it very 
difficult for young people who 
want to come in and buy their 
first home," she said.  "You know 
they've got that extra cost on the 
price of the home and everything 
else that goes with it and I think 
it'd be very difficult for them to 
start off." 1) 
The NSW Opposition would 
introduce into state parliament 
this week a bill to reduce stamp 
duty by 10 per cent, Opposition 
Leader John Brogden said today.  
As well as the bill, the opposition 
today launched a website for 
calculating the stamp duty on a 
house and a roving billboard 
showing the tax take in different 
suburbs.  Speaking in NSW 
Premier Bob Carr's electorate of 
Maroubra, Mr. Brogden told 
reporters soaring property prices 
would result in stamp duty 
revenue of $3.5 billion this year, 
and people were getting nothing 
in return.3) 
29 October 2003 
1)http://www.abc.net.au/southeastns
w/news/200310/s977524.htm 
2)http://www.theage.com.au/articles/
2003/11/05/1067708243257.html 
3)http://www.news.com.au/common/
story_page/0,4057,7674619%255E1
702,00.html 
4)http://www.nzherald.co.nz/busines
s/businessstorydisplay.cfm?storyID=
3531265&thesection=business&thes
ubsection=commproperty&thesecon
dsubsection=general&thetickercode= 
5)http://www.revenuesa.sa.gov.au/st
amps/sdreal.html 
6)http://216.239.37.104/search?q=ca
che:0sbgqt15r9UJ:www.aaa.asn.au/
pub/issuessheet/costs98.pdf+%22so
uth+australia+stamp+duty%22&hl=e
n&ie=UTF-8 
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Schofield outlined why 
Macquarie was investing in New 
Zealand, citing a limited supply of 
investment properties in 
Australia, the need to diversify its 
portfolio out of Australia, and the 
attraction of buying with less 
costs such as stamp duty, capital 
gains tax or land tax, which are 
payable in Australia but not in 
New Zealand.  These made 
investing in New Zealand even 
more attractive because the 
tenants were familiar with how 
Macquarie worked and 
Macquarie knew what the 
tenants needed.  Macquarie was 
looking for further properties in 
Auckland to fit its investment 
criteria of buying into warehouse 
and distribution centers, 
industrial estates and business 
and office parks.4) 
Australia 
(South 
Australia) 
Motor Vehicle Stamp Duty: 
In South Australia stamp duty is paid on the value of 
a new vehicle and the market value or purchase 
price (whichever is higher) of a used vehicle. For a 
vehicle valued over $3,000, stamp duty is $60plus 
$4 for every $100 over $3,000 
 
 
10 November 2003 
A spokesman for Treasurer 
Kevin Foley said any serious 
proposal to review the stamp 
duty system would be "looked 
at".1) 
Adelaide. Lord Mayor Michael 
Harbison has called for an 
overhaul of the contentious 
property sale stamp duty system, 
claiming developers were using 
loopholes to build townhouses 
rather than apartments.  He said 
the State Government tax was 
harming the development and 
progress of the city.  He said 
buyers and developers were 
taking the "easy option" and 
getting around paying their duties 
through "massive loopholes".1)   
Property Council of Australia 
president Steven Connor said 
the stamp duty system hindered 
development. "A review of the 
state tax would be appropriate. It 
certainly is a hindrance to 
buyers," he said. 
1)http://www.theadvertiser.news.com
.au/common/story_page/0,5936,781
9960%255E2682,00.html 
Australia 
(Tasmania) 
Motor vehicle stamp duty:  
Rate is 3% of MV to $35,000, 4% of MV above 
$35,000 2) 
 22 October 2003 
It was revealed last week that 
eight Tasmanian families had 
1)http://www.examiner.com.au/story.
asp?id=201004 
2)http://216.239.37.104/search?q=ca
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 accessed the grants through 
loopholes in the legislation 
allowing them to apply in the 
names of their children - all aged 
between four and 12. 1) 
che:0sbgqt15r9UJ:www.aaa.asn.au/
pub/issuessheet/costs98.pdf+%22so
uth+australia+stamp+duty%22&hl=e
n&ie=UTF-8 
Bahama The Bahamian government charges a stamp tax on 
all real estate sales or transfers. Under the Stamp 
Tax Act, this tax is split between the buyer and the 
seller unless otherwise specified or agreed to by 
both parties. 
Rates: 
Up to and including $20,000 – 2%  
From $20,000.01 to $50,000 – 4%  
From $50,000.01 to $100,000 – 6%  
From $100,000.01 to $250,000 – 8%  
From $250,000.01 and over – 10%   
There is no Government Stamp Tax to be paid on a 
sale to a first time home buyer purchasing a home 
valued up to $250,000. 1)  In addition to duties, The 
Bahamas charges a 7 percent “stamp tax” on most 
imports. Higher stamp taxes are charged on some 
duty free goods, including tourist items such as 
china, crystal, wristwatches, clocks, jewelry, table 
linens, leather goods, perfume, wine and liquor. On 
average, The Bahamas charges an export stamp tax 
of 4 percent on most exports from the country.2) 
  1)http://www.damianos.com/Sellers/
CommissionAndStampTax.asp 
2)http://www.usatrade.gov/website/c
cg.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-
BAHAMAS2002-CH-6:-00683220 
 
Belgium Stamp duty is imposed at 0.5% for contributions to a 
Belgian holding company. A contribution is a legal 
transaction involving a transfer of money or assets 
(tangible or intangible) to a company in return for 
equity instruments issued by that company. At least 
some contribution is required to incorporate a 
company.  No stamp duty arises, however, if debt 
instruments are issued, except in the case of some 
real property transactions. Some forms of 
contribution (usually in connection with a corporate 
reorganization or a share-for-share acquisition) are 
exempt from the 0.5% stamp duty if fulfill some 
requirements. 
  Hinnekens, P., et al., Belgium’s 
Holding Company Regime -The 
Dividends-Received Deduction and 
Capital Gains Exemption for Shares, 
IBFD, August 2001. 
 
China  Since the taxation reform in 1994, China has 
practiced a financial system based on separate tax 
system; and according to the principle of unifying the 
right of finance and work, it has divided rationally the 
financial revenue of the central and local 
administrations. The central government, through 
the system of tax rebate and transfer payment 
regulates the financial revenue of various districts. 
1. Saturday, 30 September 
2000 
The Chinese State Council has 
decided to raise the central 
government's share in stamp 
tax on securities trading, 
starting from October 1.   The 
share of the central government 
For proposal in 2003: 
Experts have been calling for 
further reduction as there is still 
more room for a downward 
movement compared to 
international standards.  
Tax revenue from the Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock exchanges 
1)http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw
98.htm 
2)http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/20
0009/29/eng20000929_51563.html 
3)http://www.southcn.com/english/ne
ws/money/200302270516.htm 
4)http://www.ccpit.org/vhosts/english
/Taxation.htm 
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At the same time, two sets of taxation institutions 
have been set up to carry out separate 
management. A taxation system with a value-added 
tax as the main element had been established.  At 
present, China’s taxation system consists of 25 
kinds of tax which is divided into eight kinds 
according to their nature and role. Stamp tax is 
grouped into “Act tax.” 4) 
Promulgated by the State Council on August 6, 
1988, effective October 1, 1988: 
Article 1.   All units and individuals who execute or 
receive documents in the categories specified in 
these Regulations within the People's Republic of 
China shall be taxpayers subject to stamp tax 
(hereinafter referred to as "taxpayers") and shall pay 
stamp tax in accordance with the provisions of these 
Regulations. 
Article 2.  Taxable documents include : 
(1) contracts or documents in the nature of a 
contract with regard to: purchases and sales, the 
undertaking of processing, contracting for 
construction projects, property leasing, commodity 
transport, warehousing loans, property insurance, 
technology contracts; 
(2) documents transferring property rights; 
(3) business account books; 
(4) certificates evidencing right or licenses; and (5) 
other documents which the Ministry of Finance 
determines to be taxable. 
Article 3.   According to the nature of the taxable 
document, taxpayers shall calculate the amount of 
tax due on the basis of a percentage tax rate or a 
fixed amount per document. …). 
Article 4.   Exempted documents: 
(1) duplicates or copies of documents on which 
stamp tax has already been paid; 
(2) documents executed when property is donated 
to the government, social welfare units or schools; 
(3) other documents approved by the Ministry of 
Finance for exemption from stamp tax. 
Stamp Tax Schedule of Tax Items and Tax Rates: 
Purchase and Supplier Contracts: 
0.03% of   the value of the purchases or sale. 
Processing Contract: 
0.05% of processing fee or contracted receipts. 
Survey and Design Contracts for Engineering 
and Construction Projects: 
will be raised from the current 
88 percent to 97 percent in 
three years, reducing that for 
local governments to three 
percent.  
The adjustment will be done in 
three steps, raising the central 
government's share to 91 
percent by October 1, 94 
percent by 2001 and 97 percent 
by 2002.  The nation's 
expanding stock market has led 
to steady growth in the 
government's stamp tax 
revenue in the last few years.   
The State Council said the 
adjustment is aimed at 
strengthening the central 
government's capacity to adjust 
the macro-economy. 2) 
2. 27 February 2003   
China cut the tax rate from 0.4 
per cent to the present 0.2 per 
cent in November 2001.  In 
2003, China is likely to cut the 
stamp tax for stock trading soon 
to revitalize trading on the 
bourses. Several ways have 
been suggested to reduce 
stamp tax but the government 
will most likely stop the levy on 
stock buyers, insiders said. 3) 
declined by about two-thirds last 
year from 2001, according to the 
China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC).   A 
reduction of the tax can help 
boost trading in the bourses and 
re-activate market sentiment, 
said Dong, who co-authored a 
report to the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange last November, which 
advocated the stamp tax cut.  
Though the tax cut would mean 
lower income for the 
government, it would have a 
positive impact on the stock 
market in the long term because 
of improved market liquidity, the 
report said.   Many developed 
countries have stopped levying 
stamp tax in the stock market 
and most emerging markets tax 
sellers an average of only 0.1 per 
cent. China needs to further 
lower trading costs for investors 
and improve the market liquidity, 
said Yang Dali, an analyst with 
Shenyin and Wanguo Securities 
Co.  The stamp tax has an 
obvious impact on turnover in the 
bourses, so a lower level can 
often activate trading and 
increase market efficiency, said 
Yang, adding that the most 
feasible plan is to stop charging 
tax on buyers to encourage 
turnover.  
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0.05% of receipts 
Construction, Installation, and Engineering 
Contracts: 
0.03% of contracted amount 
Property Leasing Contracts: 
 0.1% of lease amount; amounts less than 1 Yuan to 
be stamped as 1 Yuan. 
Commodity Shipping Contract: 
0.05% of transport fees. 
Warehousing Contracts: 
0.01% of warehousing & storage fee. 
Loan Contracts: 
0.005% of loan amount 
Property insurance contracts 
0.003% of amount insured 
Technology Contracts: 
0.03% of indicated amount 
Property Transfer Documents 
0.05% of indicated amount 
Business Accounting Documents: 
0.05% of recorded capital 
Permits and Licenses: 
5 Yuan 1) 
All securities trading: 
0.4% stamp tax on both sides for central and local. 
Change to 0.2% in 2001 2) 
Major Exemptions: 
Tax exemptions may be granted on duplicates or 
copies of documents on which Stamp Tax has 
already been paid; documents executed when 
property is donated to the government, social 
welfare units supporting the widowed, the aged, the 
injured and the handicapped, or schools; non-
interest bearing or discounting loan contracts; 
preferential loan contracts concluded between 
foreign governments or international financial 
institutions and the Chinese government or State 
financial institutions; and insurance contracts for 
agriculture and forestry products, and animals in 
animal husbandry 
Hong Kong Rate of Stamp Duty on Property Transfer: 
3.75% of purchase consideration for the properties 
which transferred into Real Estate Investment & 
Trust (REITs). 
Rate of Stamp Duty on Transfer of Share: 
0.2% where the Special Purpose Companies (SPVs) 
whose shares are transferred is incorporated in 
  http://www.freshfields.com/places/asi
a/publications/newsletters/asia_sfina
nce/6306.pdf 
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Hong Kong. 
0% where it is incorporated outside Hong Kong and 
maintains its share register outside Hong Kong 
Indonesia Stamp Duty Rate (effective 1 May 2000): 
1. Contract and other documents for legal purpose, 
common letter for court purpose, deeds and their 
copies = Rp 6,000. 
2. Documents that contain amount of money, 
promissory notes, and acceptance letters: 
Less than Rp 250,000=0 
Rp 250,000-Rp 1,000,000=Rp3,000 
More than Rp 1,000,000=Rp6,000 
3. Cash check and uncashed check=Rp 3,000 
4. Securities either individual or collective: 
Face value less than Rp 1,000,000 = Rp3,000 
More than Rp 1,000,000 = Rp6,000 1) 
 
Property Transfer Tax on Land and Buildings 
(effective 1 January 2001): 
Based on transaction value or market price= 
5%. 7)   The amount of exemptions is authority of 
local government.  It varies from Rp 10 million 
to 60 million. 
 
Old Rate: 
Stamp duty rate (effective 21 
April 1995 until 30 April 2000): 
1. Contract and other 
documents for legal purpose, 
common letter for court 
purpose, deeds and their 
copies = Rp 2,000. 
2. Documents that contain 
amount of money, promissory 
notes, and acceptance letters: 
Less than Rp 250,000=0 
Rp 250,000-Rp 
1,000,000=Rp1,000 
More than Rp 
1,000,000=Rp2,000 
3. Cash check an uncashed 
check= Rp1,000 
4. Securities: 
Face value less than Rp 
1,000,000 = Rp 0 
More than Rp 1,000,000 = 
Rp2,000 2) 
 
Property Transfer Tax on 
Land and Buildings (effective 
1 January 1998 until 31 
December 2000): 
Based on transaction value or 
market price. 
Less than Rp 30 million = 0% 
More than Rp 30 million = 
5%.5) 
This tax will be shared to lower 
level government after 
decentralization 20% for 
central govt. 80% for local 
governments 6) 
Stock issuers changed their 
paper stocks to electronic stocks 
to avoid stamp duty from new 
regulation.3)  Stamp duty 
increased significantly in three 
recent years, from Rp0.6 trillion 
(0.05 % of GDP) in fiscal year 
1999/2000 to Rp0.9 trillion (0.09 
% GDP) in 2000, and estimated 
to Rp1.9 trillion(0.1% of GDP) in 
2001.4)  Many people in 
Kecamatan Serdang might not 
get their land certificate since 
they were not able to pay the 
high property transfer tax8). 
1)http://kambing.vlsm.org/bebas/v01/
RI/pp/2000/pp-2000-024.txt 
2)http://www.theceli.com/dokumen/pr
oduk/pp/1995/7-1995.htm 
3)http://www.ksei.co.id/Fokuss/Edisi
%207/BEA%20MATERAI%20YANG
%20MEMBEBANKAN%20ITU.htm 
4)http://www.fiskal.depkeu.go.id/nk2
002.asp?kd=43 
5)http://www.theceli.com/dokumen/pr
oduk/1997/uu21-1997.htm 
6)http://www.theceli.com/dokumen/pr
oduk/pp/1997/33-1997.htm 
7)http://www.suaramerdeka.com/hari
an/0308/19/eko11.htm 
8)http://www.kompas.com/kompas-
cetak/0309/18/metro/569305.htm 
Ireland There are no sub-national taxes in Ireland. 
Stamp duty imposed on: 
• Transfer (including gift) of shares and securities 
at 1%. 
• Transfer of most other Irish assets (where 
ownership passes by legal instrument) at rates 
Change in Territorial Scope of 
Capital Acquisitions Tax  or 
CAT (include Stamp Duty)  
Former regime (before 1 
December  1999): 
• Gift received from an 
Implications of New Regime: 
The territorial scope of CAT has 
been significantly expanded to 
the extent that gifts, inheritances 
and benefits from trust received 
by individuals who are resident 
1) Ward, John, “Fiscal Politics for 
the Economic Enterprise in Ireland” 
IBFD February 2000. 
2) http://www.philiporeilly.com/taxce
ntre/StampDuty.htm#residential 
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up to 6%. (on transactions exceeding IEP 
60,000). A different rate table applies to certain 
residential property: in this case, the highest rate 
is 9% (on transactions exceeding IEP 500,000). 
• The rate of duty is generally halved for interfamily 
transfers other than share transfers; all transfers 
between spouses are exempt. 
• Capital duty is imposed at rate of 1% on share 
issues and other capital contributions to limited 
liability entities.1) 
 
New stamp duty rates effective from the 27th 
February, 2002 are as set out below. 
 
Stamp Duty for Used Houses 
1st Time 
(Second-
€ Rate of Rate of Stamp 
€0 to €127,000 Exempt  Exempt 
€127,001 - 190,500 Exempt 3% 
€190,501 - 254,000 3% 4% 
€254,001 - 317,000 3.75% 5% 
€317,501 - 381,000 4.50% 6% 
€381,001 - 635,000 7.50% 7.50% 
€635,001 and over 9% 9% 
 
Stamp Duty for New Homes: 
The following are the rates applicable to new 
houses/apartments greater than 125 sq. meters 
(taking into account the restricted consideration): 
 
individual who was 
domiciled in Ireland on the 
date the gift was made. 
• Inheritances received from 
an individual who was 
domiciled in Ireland on the 
date of his death. 
• All other gifts and 
inheritances of Irish-situs 
property. 
   
New Regime (Started at 1 
December 1999): 
• Gift received on or after 
December 1st 1999 from an 
individual who was resident 
or ordinarily resident in 
Ireland in the tax year in 
which the gift was made. 
• Inheritances received on or 
after December 1st, 1999 
from an individual who was 
resident or ordinarily 
resident in Ireland in the tax 
year in which he died. 
• Gift received on or after 
December 1st 1999 by an 
individual who was resident 
or ordinarily resident in 
Ireland in the tax year in 
which the gift was received. 
• Inheritances received on or 
after December 1st, 1999 by 
an individual who was 
resident or ordinarily 
resident in Ireland in the tax 
year in which the inheritance 
was received. 
• All other gifts and 
inheritances comprising 
Irish-situs property, but only 
to extent they comprise such 
property. 1) 
or ordinarily resident in Ireland 
may now be caught, unless the 
recipient can use the exceptions 
for non-domiciled individuals set 
out above. In old regime, the 
residence or domicile status of 
the recipient of a benefit was not 
relevant from a territory 
perspective. 
 
The weaknesses of new regime 
are: 
• The territorial scope of CAT 
has been potentially reduced 
to a significant extent in 
relation to gifts, inheritances 
and benefit from trust received 
from an Irish domiciled donor 
(or settler) where that 
individual is neither resident 
nor ordinarily resident in 
Ireland. 
• New regime will make an 
individual may often wish to 
make transfers to Irish-based 
beneficiaries.1) 
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€190,501 - 254,000 3% 4% 
€254,001 - 317,500 3.75% 5% 
€317,501 - 381,000 4.50% 6% 
€381,001 - 635,000 7.50% 7.50% 
€635,000 or more  9% 9% 
 
Commercial Stamp Duty Rates: 
The rates of stamp duty applicable to commercial 
property are different than those applied to 
residential property and the current rates are as set 
out below:  
 
Aggregate Consideration  
Rate of 
Duty 
Up to €10,000 Exempt 
€10,001 - €20,000 1%
€20,001 - €30,000 2%
€30,001 - €40,000 3%
€40,001 - €70,000 4%
€70,001 - €80,000 5%
€80,001 - €100,000 6%
€100,001 - €120,000 7%
€120,001 - €150,000 8%
Over €150,000 9%
(Source : 2) 
 
Israel Stamp Tax Rates: 
Document Type: 
A. When the value is stipulated in the 
documents: 
• Insurance contracts for ships or airplanes= 0.1% 
• Contract, memorandum, promissory note, lien 
and any non-transferable guarantee or 
obligation= 0.4% 
• Issuing of nominee shares, nominee bonds and 
deeds of trust = 1% 
• Insurance policies = 1.5% 
• Transferable guarantees or obligations = 2% 
• Sea freight insurance = 3% 
B. Where the value is not stipulated in the 
document  = $1.20 
 Ehud Menirav (2000): 
It is difficult to collect the stamp 
tax and most individuals do not 
pay it at all. Furthermore, the 
collection pf the tax is carried out 
inefficiently without a 
computerized database and with 
a low level of service to the 
taxpayer. The distortions to the 
economy include the increased 
cost of issuing securities on the 
stock exchange and the 
reduction of alternatives for 
saving and borrowing.  
Ehud Menirav, Stamp Tax in Israel, 
Institute for Advanced Strategic and 
Political Studies, Policy Studies No. 
44, January 2000. 
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Japan Stamp tax is levied on certain documents such as 
contracts, bills and share certificates. As a rule, the 
tax is levied by affixing revenue stamps covering the 
amount equal to the stamp tax to those documents. 
However, in certain cases, such as when many 
taxable documents are processed repeatedly, 
taxpayers may, for convenience, choose self-
assessment or payment in cash. Tax rates vary from 
200 yen to 600,000 yen per document. Revenue 
stamps are also used for payment of registration 
license tax levied when registering the 
establishment or transfer of property rights and for 
payment of national examination fees. 
  http://www.nta.go.jp/category/outline/
english/1832/text/02/04_7.htm 
Kenya   23 October 2003  
Lands Minister Amos Kimunya 
blew the whistle on a syndicate 
involving his officers, land agents 
and bankers.  Kimunya revealed 
that the syndicate has been 
diverting millions of shillings 
received as stamp duty to their 
pockets.  Half of all stamp duty 
paid to the Government ends up 
in people's pockets.  He said the 
syndicate operates mainly in 
Nairobi and Mombasa but was 
slowly spreading to other areas. 
1) 
1)http://www.eastandard.net/headlin
es/news231003004.htm 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rate of Stamp Duty on Transfer of Share: 
In Malaysia, stamp duty is payable on a transfer of 
shares at 0.3 percent of the consideration paid, or 
the market value, whichever is higher. The Stamp 
Office uses as the market value the higher of the 
pro-rata net tangibles asset value or a price-
earnings multiple of 11. 1) 
Rate of Stamp Duty on Property Transfer: 
1 percent on the first MYR 100,000, 2 percent on the 
next MYR 400,000, 3 percent for the next MYR 
1,500,000, and 4 percent on the balance of the 
value of the property or the consideration given for 
it, whichever is higher. 1) 
Stamp Duty on Charges 
A charge on property is an instrument created by 
statue, namely the NLC. It affords the Chargee a 
security for loan granted to the Chargor over the 
property charged. Stamp duty is calculated at the 
rate of about 0.5% of the loan amount.2) 
  1)http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/r
eadingsintaxpolicy.nsf/0/1D537D4C2
06E166685256B820080661F?Open
Document 
2)http://www.propertylookout.com/st
amp.htm 
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Stamp Duty on Leases and Tenancy Agreements 
First, calculate the total rent for one year. Then, take 
away RM 2,400 from that total rent, because the first 
RM 2,400 is free from stamp duty. 
For  every RM 250: 
Not exceeding1 year = RM 1 
1 – 3 years  = RM 2 
Exceeding 3 years = RM 4.2) 
Mexico Real property transfer tax is imposed locally in range 
from 2% to 3% of the purchase price. 
  Fonseca, Marcela, et al., Tax 
Aspects of Structuring and Disposing 
of Investments in Mexico, IBFD, 
November, 2001 
New 
Zealand 
 
 
Stamp Duty Abolition (21 May 
21 1999): 
Repealed two types of stamp 
duty: 
Conveyance duty and lease 
duty, but still retain cheque 
duty. 1)  So abolish the old 
stamp duty as follows: 
Payable on commercial land 
and buildings at the rate of:  
• 1 % on the first $50,000  
• 1.5% on the second $50,000  
•   2% on the balance 2) 
Comment on Stamp Duty 
Abolition: 
The business community will 
welcome the abolition. With the 
removal in the last decade of 
stamp duty on share transfer, 
many businesses have retained 
cumbersome corporate 
structures in order to retain 
commercial buildings within 
special purpose companies. 
Corporate reconstructions have 
often forced large corporate 
groups into complex tax planning 
initiative in order to avoid fiscal 
cost simply moving a property 
between two wholly owned 
companies. Removal of stamp 
duty will facilitate a further round 
of corporate simplification and 
amalgamations, and reduce 
compliance costs.1) 
1)Sawyer, Adrian J., A “Minority 
Government Budget Mixing Election 
Year Sweetners With Restraint?”, 
IBFD, August/September 1999 
2)http://www.bkrlewbarr.com/taxfacts
/nz.htm 
Pakistan 25 September 2001 
Sindh government collects stamp duty on a variety 
of business activities, property transactions and 
financial documents. There is a stamp duty schedule 
and rates are announced in the yearly provincial 
budgets.  
 25 September 2001 
The individual businessmen and 
the business concerns either do 
not recognize Sindh 
government's fiscal jurisdiction, 
or if they do so, they circumvent 
the payment in collusion with the 
banks in case of financial 
documents. Mostly, the officers 
of the revenue department help 
the businessmen and companies 
to evade stamp duties. 
http://dawn.com/2001/09/26/ebr8.ht
m 
Papua New A rate of stamp duty of 5% is imposed on   http://www.bkrlewbarr.com/taxfacts/p
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Guinea documents that constitute a deed of gift. Further 
duty is payable on other documents. 
ng.htm 
Philippines Subject of Stamp Tax:  
SEC. 173. Stamp Taxes Upon Documents, Loan 
Agreements, Instruments and Papers. That 
whenever one party to the taxable document enjoys 
exemption from the tax herein imposed, the other 
party who is not exempt shall be the one directly 
liable for the tax.  
SEC. 174. Stamp Tax on Debentures and 
Certificates of Indebtedness. Rate is one peso and 
fifty centavos (P1.50) on each Two hundred pesos 
(P200), or fractional part thereof, of the face value of 
such documents.  
SEC. 175. Stamp Tax on Original Issue of Shares of 
Stock. – Tax rate is two pesos (P2.00) on each Two 
hundred pesos (P200), or fractional part thereof, of 
the par value, of such shares of stock: Provided, 
That in the case of the original issue of shares of 
stock without par value the amount of the 
documentary stamp tax herein prescribed shall be 
based upon the actual consideration for the 
issuance of such shares of stock: provided, further, 
That in the case of stock dividends, on the actual 
value represented by each share.  
SEC. 176. Stamp Tax on Sales, Agreements to Sell, 
Memoranda of Sales, Deliveries or Transfer of Due-
bills, Certificates of Obligation, or Shares of 
Certificates of Stock.  Tax rate is one peso and fifty 
centavos (P1.50) on each Two hundred pesos 
(P200) or fractional part thereof, of the par value of 
such due-bill, certificate of obligation or stock; 
Provided, That only one tax shall be collected on 
each sale or transfer of stock or securities from one 
person to another, regardless of whether or not a 
certificate of stock or obligation is issued, indorsed, 
or delivered in pursuance of such sale or transfer: 
and Provided, further, That in the case of stock 
without par value the amount of documentary stamp 
tax herein prescribed shall be equivalent to twenty-
five percent (25%) of the documentary stamp tax 
paid upon the original issue of said stock.  
SEC. 177. Stamp Tax on Bonds, Debentures, 
Certificate of Stock or Indebtedness Issued in 
Foreign Countries. 
SEC. 178. Stamp Tax on Certificates of Profits or 
Interest in Property or Accumulations. Tax rate is 
 19 March 2003 
Lawmaker calls for documentary 
stamp tax reforms.  The clamor 
of the Philippine Stock Exchange 
(PSE) to rationalize the 
imposition of documentary stamp 
tax on the issuance of shares 
and stock certificates has 
obtained popular support from 
Sen. Ralph G. Recto.   Recto has 
sponsored Senate Bill 2518, 
otherwise known as The 
Documentary Stamp Tax Bill, 
which he said “aims to break 
investment barriers, remove 
distortions from the domestic 
capital market, develop it, 
mobilize savings, and hopefully 
alleviate poverty.” 2) 
1)http://www.bir.gov.ph/nirc/nir_tl07_
ch00.html 
2)http://www.manilatimes.net/nationa
l/2003/mar/19/business/20030319bu
s13.html 
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fifty centavos (P0.50) on each Two hundred pesos 
(P200), or fractional part thereof, of the face value of 
such certificate or memorandum.  
SEC. 179. Stamp Tax on Bank Checks, Drafts, 
Certificates of Deposit not Bearing Interest, and 
Other Instruments. Tax rate is one peso and fifty 
centavos (P1.50).  
 SEC. 180. Stamp Tax on All Bonds, Loan 
Agreements, promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange, 
Drafts, Instruments and Securities Issued by the 
Government or Any of its Instrumentalities, Deposit 
Substitute Debt Instruments, Certificates of Deposits 
Bearing Interest and Others Not Payable on Sight or 
Demand. Tax rate is thirty centavos (P0.30) on each 
Two hundred pesos (P200), or fractional part 
thereof, of the face value of any such agreement, bill 
of exchange, draft, certificate of deposit, or note: 
Provided, That only one documentary stamp tax 
shall be imposed on either loan agreement, or 
promissory notes issued to secure such loan, 
whichever will yield a higher tax: Provided, however, 
That loan agreements or promissory notes the 
aggregate of which does not exceed Two hundred 
fifty thousand pesos (P250,000) executed by an 
individual for his purchase on installment for his 
personal use or that of his family and not for 
business, resale, barter or hire of a house, lot, motor 
vehicle, appliance or furniture shall be exempt from 
the payment of the documentary stamp tax provided 
under this Section.  
SEC. 181. Stamp Tax Upon Acceptance of Bills of 
Exchange and Others. Tax rate is Thirty centavos 
(P0.30) on each Two hundred pesos (P200), or 
fractional part thereof, of the face value of any such 
bill of exchange, or order, or the Philippine 
equivalent to such value, if expressed in foreign 
currency.  
SEC. 182. Stamp Tax on Foreign Bills of Exchange 
and Letters of Credit. - On all foreign bills of 
exchange and letters of credit (including orders, by 
telegraph or otherwise, for the payment of money 
issued by express or steamship companies or by 
any person or persons) drawn in but payable out of 
the Philippines in a set of three (3) or more 
according to the custom of merchants and bankers, 
there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of 
Thirty centavos (P0.30) on each Two hundred pesos 
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(P200), or fractional part thereof, of the face value of 
any such bill of exchange or letter of credit, or the 
Philippine equivalent of such face value, if 
expressed in foreign currency.  
SEC. 183. Stamp Tax on Life Insurance Policies. 
Tax rate is fifty centavos (P0.50) on each Two 
hundred pesos (P200), or fractional part thereof, of 
the amount insured by any such policy.  
SEC. 184. Stamp Tax on Policies of Insurance Upon 
Property. Tax rate is fifty centavos (P0.50) on each 
Four pesos (P4.00), or fractional part thereof, of the 
amount of premium charged.  Provided, however, 
that no documentary stamp tax shall be collected on 
reinsurance contracts or on any instrument by which 
cession or acceptance of insurance risks under any 
reinsurance agreement is effected or recorded.  
SEC. 185. Stamp Tax on Fidelity Bonds and Other 
Insurance Policies. Tax rate is fifty centavos (P0.50) 
on each four pesos (P4.00), or fractional part 
thereof, of the premium charged.  
SEC. 186. Stamp Tax on Policies of Annuities and 
Pre-Need Plans. Tax rates are one peso and fifty 
centavos (P1.50) on each two hundred pesos 
(P200) or fractional part thereof, of the capital of the 
annuity, or should this be unknown, then on each 
two hundred (P200) pesos, or fractional part thereof, 
of thirty-three and one-third (33 1/3) times the 
annual income. On pre-need plans, the 
documentary stamp tax shall be fifty centavos 
(P0.50) on each five hundred pesos (P500), or 
fractional part thereof, of the value or amount of the 
plan.  
SEC. 187. Stamp Tax on Indemnity Bonds. Tax rate 
is thirty centavos (P0.30) on each four pesos 
(P4.00), or fractional part thereof, of the premium 
charged.  
SEC. 188. Stamp Tax on Certificates.  On each 
certificate of damages or otherwise, and on every 
certificate or document issued by any customs 
officer, marine surveyor, or other person acting as 
such, and on each certificate issued by a notary 
public, and on each certificate of any description 
required by law or by rules or regulations of a public 
office, or which is issued for the purpose of giving 
information, or establishing proof of a fact, and not 
otherwise specified herein, there shall be collected a 
documentary stamp tax of fifteen pesos (P15.00).  
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SEC. 189. Stamp Tax on Warehouse Receipts. Tax 
rate is fifteen pesos (P15.00).  Provided: That no tax 
shall be collected on each warehouse receipt issued 
to any one person in any one calendar month 
covering property the value of which does not 
exceed two hundred pesos (P200).  
 SEC. 190. Stamp Tax on Jai-Alai, Horse Racing 
Tickets, lotto or Other Authorized Numbers Games. 
– Tax rates are ten centavos (P0.10).  Provided: 
That if the cost of the ticket exceeds One peso 
(P1.00), an additional tax of ten centavos (P0.10) on 
every one peso (P1.00), or fractional part thereof, 
shall be collected.  
SEC. 191. Stamp Tax on Bills of Lading or Receipts. 
Tax rate is one peso (P1.00), if the value of such 
goods exceeds one hundred pesos (P100) and does 
not exceed one thousand pesos (P1,000); ten pesos 
(P10), if the value exceeds one thousand pesos 
(P1,000).  Provided, however, that freight tickets 
covering goods, merchandise or effects carried as 
accompanied baggage of passengers on land and 
water carriers primarily engaged in the 
transportation of passengers are hereby exempt.  
SEC. 192. Stamp Tax on Proxies.  On each proxy 
for voting at any election for officers of any company 
or association, or for any other purpose, except 
proxies issued affecting the affairs of associations or 
corporations organized for religious, charitable or 
literary purposes, there shall be collected a 
documentary stamp tax of fifteen pesos (P15.00).  
 SEC. 193. Stamp Tax on Powers of Attorney. Tax 
rate is five pesos (P5.00).  
SEC. 194. Stamp tax on Leases and Other Hiring 
Agreements. Tax rates are three pesos (P3.00) for 
the first two thousand pesos (P2,000), or fractional 
part thereof, and an additional one peso (P1.00) for 
every one thousand pesos (P1,000) or fractional 
part thereof, in excess of the first two thousand 
pesos (P2,000) for each year of the term of said 
contract or agreement.  
SEC. 195. Stamp Tax on Mortgages, Pledges and 
Deeds of Trust. Tax rates are: 
(a) When the amount secured does not exceed five 
thousand pesos (P5,000), twenty pesos (P20.00).  
(b) On each five thousand pesos (P5,000), or 
fractional part thereof in excess of five thousand 
pesos (P5,000), an additional tax of ten pesos 
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(P10.00). 
SEC. 196. Stamp tax on Deeds of Sale and 
Conveyances of Real Property. A documentary 
stamp tax, at the rates herein below prescribed, 
based on the consideration contracted to be paid for 
such realty or on its fair market value determined in 
accordance with Section 6(E) of this Code, 
whichever is higher.  Provided, that when one of the 
contracting parties is the Government the tax herein 
imposed shall be based on the actual consideration.  
(a) When the consideration, or value received or 
contracted to be paid for such realty after making 
proper allowance of any encumbrance, does not 
exceed one thousand pesos (P1,000) fifteen pesos 
(P15.00).  
(b) For each additional one thousand pesos 
(P1,000), or fractional part thereof in excess of one 
thousand pesos (P1,000) of such consideration or 
value, fifteen pesos (P15.00). 
SEC. 197. Stamp Tax on Charter Parties and 
Similar Instruments. A documentary stamp tax at the 
following rates:  
(a) If the registered gross tonnage of the ship, 
vessel or steamer does not exceed one thousand 
(1,000) tons, and the duration of the charter or 
contract does not exceed six (6) months, five 
hundred pesos (P500); and for each month or 
fraction of a month in excess of six (6) months, an 
additional tax of fifty pesos (P50.00) shall be paid.  
(b) If the registered gross tonnage exceeds one 
thousand (1,000) tons and does not exceed ten 
thousand (10,000) tons, and the duration of the 
charter or contract does not exceed six (6) months, 
one thousand pesos (P1,000); and for each month 
or fraction of a month in excess of six (6) months, an 
additional tax of one hundred pesos (P100) shall be 
paid.  
(c) If the registered gross tonnage exceeds ten 
thousand (10,000) tons and the duration of the 
charter or contract does not exceed six (6) months, 
one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500); and for 
each month or fraction of a month in excess of six 
(6) months, an additional tax of one hundred fifty 
pesos (P150) shall be paid.  
SEC. 198. Stamp Tax on Assignments and 
Renewals of Certain Instruments. A documentary 
stamp tax, at the same rate as that imposed on the 
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original instrument.  
SEC. 199. Documents and Papers Not Subject to 
Stamp Tax.  The provisions of Section 173 to the 
contrary notwithstanding, the following instruments, 
documents and papers shall be exempt from the 
documentary stamp tax:  
(a) Policies of insurance or annuities made or 
granted by a fraternal or beneficiary society, order, 
association or cooperative company, operated on 
the lodge system or local cooperation plan and 
organized and conducted solely by the members 
thereof for the exclusive benefit of each member 
and not for profit.  
(b) Certificates of oaths administered to any 
government official in his official capacity or of 
acknowledgment by any government official in the 
performance of his official duties, written 
appearance in any court by any government official, 
in his official capacity; certificates of the 
administration of oaths to any person as to the 
authenticity of any paper required to be filed in court 
by any person or party thereto, whether the 
proceedings be civil or criminal; papers and 
documents filed in courts by or for the national, 
provincial, city or municipal governments; affidavits 
of poor persons for the purpose of proving poverty; 
statements and other compulsory information 
required of persons or corporations by the rules and 
regulations of the national, provincial, city or 
municipal governments exclusively for statistical 
purposes and which are wholly for the use of the 
bureau or office in which they are filed, and not at 
the instance or for the use or benefit of the person 
filing them; certified copies and other certificates 
placed upon documents, instruments and papers for 
the national, provincial, city, or municipal 
governments, made at the instance and for the sole 
use of some other branch of the national, provincial, 
city or municipal governments; and certificates of the 
assessed value of lands, not exceeding Two 
hundred pesos (P200) in value assessed, furnished 
by the provincial, city or municipal Treasurer to 
applicants for registration of title to land.  
SEC. 200. Payment of Documentary Stamp Tax. 
(A) In General. - The provisions of Presidential 
Decree No. 1045 notwithstanding, any person liable 
to pay documentary stamp tax upon any document 
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subject to tax under Title VII of this Code shall file a 
tax return and pay the tax in accordance with the 
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the 
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the 
Commissioner.1) 
Singapore Stamp Duty Rates on Major Documents: 
On sale and purchase or gift of immovable 
property (effective 29 February 1996): 
Purchase price or market value, whichever is higher: 
• Every $100 or part thereof of the first $180,000= 
$1 
• Every $100 or part thereof of the next $180,000 = 
$2 
• Thereafter, every $100 or part thereof = $3 
On mortgage of immovable property or stocks & 
shares (effective 29 February 1996): 
Amount of facilities granted= $4 for every $1,000 or 
part thereof (maximum $500) 
On tenancy/lease of immovable property 
(effective 1 April 2003): 
Contractual rent or market rent, whichever is higher: 
For annual rent & other consideration calculated 
for a whole year exceeds $1,000: 
Less than 1 year = $1 for every $250 or part thereof. 
1 to 3 years = $2 for every $250 or part thereof. 
More than 3 years= $4 for every $250 or part 
thereof. 
Exemption: if average annual rent and other 
consideration calculated for a whole year does not 
exceed $1,000 
On transfer or gift of share (effective 1 April 
1980): 
Purchase price or net assets value of the share, 
whichever is higher = $0.20 for every $100 or part 
thereof.1) 
Old rate: 
On tenancy/lease of 
immovable property (effective 
29 February 1996 to 31 March 
2003): 
For annual rent & other 
consideration calculated for a 
whole year does not exceed 
$500: 
Lease less than 1 year = $2 
1 to 3 years = $4 
more than 3 years= $8 
For annual rent & other 
consideration calculated for a 
whole year exceeds $500: 
Less than 1 year = $1 for every 
$250 or part thereof. 
1 to 3 years = $2 for every $250 
or part thereof. 
more than 3 years= $4 for every 
$250 or part thereof.1) 
Temporarily reduction in rates 
of stamp duty (October 2001): 
The rates of stamp duty on all 
chargeable instruments 
executed from 13 October 2001 
through 31 December 2002 
have been reduced by 30%. 
They were offered to tackle the 
Singapore’s economic 
downturn. 2) 
Comment on temporary 
reduction in rates of stamp duty 
(October 2001): 
The reduction in the stamp duty 
and petrol excise duty has 
attracted a similar response from 
the business community. Many 
businessmen like the cuts and 
think that the measures will 
reduce business costs 
somewhat. Some still maintain, 
however, that all these measures 
are not adequate as they do nit 
really address the underlying 
problem of small and medium-
sized enterprises.2) 
1)https://concorde.asianconnect.com
/esp/image/SD_RATES.pdf 
2) Lee Fook Hong, Singapore’s 
Second Off-Budget Measures to 
Tackle the Economic Downturn, 
IBFD, December 2001. 
South 
Africa 
Stamp duty of between 0.5% and 1.5% is applied on 
certain documents. 
  http://www.bkrlewbarr.com/taxfacts/s
outh_africa.htm 
South 
Korea 
1. Taxpayer 
Stamp tax is levied on a person who prepares a 
document certifying establishment, transfer, or 
change of rights to property.  
2. Tax Base 
The tax base of stamp tax is as follows:  
a. Bracketed fixed amount tax - Amount stated on 
the deed;  
b. Fixed amount tax - Per copy of deeds and per 
  1)http://english.mofe.go.kr/library/l_b
ook_list.php?t=eh_book_a&d=158 
2)http://www.korealaw.com/content/i
mmigration/immigration01_07.asp?id
x=186&cate=28 
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volume of books. 
3. Tax Rate 
a. Deed of contract concerning transfer of real 
estate, vessel, aircraft, or business, deed of contract 
concerning loans for consumption, deed of contract 
concerning contract for work. 
10 million Won> C > 30 million won = 20,000 won. 
30 million Won >= C < 50 million won = 40,000 won. 
50 million Won <= C < 100 million Won = 70,000 
won.  
100 million Won <= C <  1 billion Won  = 150,000 
won 
more than 1 billion Won = 350,000 
b. Deed concerning transfer of registered movable 
property (car, heavy machinery, vessel) 
3,000 Won 
c. Deed concerning land use rights or easements 
3,000 Won 
d. Deed concerning transfer of mining rights, 
intangible property, fishing rights, copyright, or firm 
name rights 
3,000 Won 
e. Deed concerning rights of usable facilities (golf 
and condominium membership cards) 
10,000 Won 
f. Deed concerning continued and repeated 
transactions = 1,000 Won 
g. Merchandise coupon, share certificate, bond, 
investment certificate, beneficial certificate = 
400 won 
h. Insurance policy, deposit or savings certificate, 
deposit or savings passbook, trust certificate or 
passbook = 100 won 
i. Deed of contract concerning lease or deferred 
payment sale = 10,000 won 
j. Deed concerning guarantee of obligation: 
¾ Deed published by a bank = 10,000 won 
Deed published by Credit Guarantee Fund = 1,000 
won 
¾ Deed published by an insurer = 200 won 
4. Payment  
In preparing documents, the stamp tax is payable 
by passing stamp on the documents. The head of 
tax office receives stamp tax on cash.  
5. Exemption  
a. Documents prepared by the government or local 
autonomous bodies  
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b. Documents prepared with respect to the 
treatment of treasury funds  
c. Documents submitted to government agencies 
with respect to a donation for public works  
d. Documents prepared by charity or relief 
organizations with respect to their businesses  
e. Deed of contract concerning lease or deposit of 
residential house  
f. Merchandise coupon with the face value below 
10,000 Won  
g. Certificates of acceptance or guarantee of bills  
h. Copies or transcripts of negotiable securities  
i. Deed of contract concerning the ownership of 
residential house  valued at below 1 billion  
j. Deed of contract concerning loans for 
consumption at below 20 million  
k. Bonds issued by the Bank of Korea or other 
international finance bodies 1) 
 
6. Cost of Filing Lawsuit 
Claim Amount (in Won) Stamp Tax 
1 ~ 10,000,000 Won 0.50% of the Claim Amount 
10,000,001 ~ 100,000,000 Won 0.45% + 5000 Won 
100,000,001 ~ 1,000,000,000 Won 0.40% + 55,000 
Won 
1,000,000,001 and greater 0.35% + 555,000 Won 
The above fees need to be paid at the time of filing 
the claim. Appellants must also pay an additional, 
increased stamp tax when filing an appeal as 
follows: 
Initial appeals filed with appeals courts are subject 
to the corresponding stamp tax above plus a 
surcharge of 50% of the stamp tax amount. 
Appeals to the Supreme Court of Korea are subject 
to the corresponding stamp tax above plus a 
surcharge of 100% of the stamp tax amount. 2) 
Switzerland Issuance Stamp Tax 
A 1% issuance stamp tax is charged on the 
issuance of all share capital of a company in excess 
of the first CHF 250,000. All forms of contributions to 
the equity of a Swiss-domiciled corporation, 
including deemed contributions, are subject to the 
stamp tax. However, newly issued shares in the 
course of reorganizations, mergers, spin-offs and 
similar transactions are exempt from the tax. 
Transaction Stamp Tax 
The federal government imposes a transaction 
  http://www.geneva.ch/genevaguidest
amptax.htm 
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stamp tax as much as 0.15% of the sales price for 
securities issued by a resident of Switzerland and 
0.3% for securities issued by a resident of a foreign 
country, on the sale or exchange of securities 
through entities considered to be securities dealers, 
such as the following :  
Banks and other financial institutions subject to 
federal banking legislation, including the Swiss 
National Bank, business entities (including 
permanent establishments of foreign entities) as well 
as individuals whose principal activity is the 
purchase and sale of securities for their own 
account or for third parties (traders) or portfolio 
management, manager of investment funds, and 
corporations, limited partnerships or cooperatives 
which own taxable securities with a book value of 
more than CHF 10 million, taxable securities include 
shares, bonds, debentures, promissory notes, bills 
of exchange and long-term certifi-cates of deposit.
  
Taiwan 
(Hsiu Chu 
City) 
A. About Stamp Tax       
 The Stamp Tax Law was amended in January 
1986. After the amendment, only four items 
remained taxable. The revenue generated from 
stamp taxation amounted to only 0.6% of the total 
tax revenue in 1997. This trend shows that the 
stamp tax will be phased out in the not too distant 
future.        
B. Stamp Tax Rates        
Monetary receipts: affix tax stamps at 0.4% of the 
amount received, with the exception of 0.1% for 
money deposited by bidders.   
Contracting agreements: affix tax stamps at 0.1% 
of the contract price.   
Contracts of deeds for sale, gratuitous transfer, 
exchange or partition of the contract price or 
value of the real estate.     
Contracts for sale of movables: affix tax stamps at 
NT$12 per piece.  1) 
  1.http://www.hcct.gov.tw/Eng/page_b
08.htm 
Taiwan 
(Taipei) 
Types of Document Tax Rate: 
Monetary receipts – Affix tax stamp at 0.4% of the 
amount received, with the exception of 0.1% for 
money deposited by bidders. 
Dees for sale of movable – Affix tax stamps at 
NT$12 per piece. 
Contracting agreements – Affix tax stamps at 0.1% 
of the contract price. 
  http://www.tpctax.gov.tw/english/gnd
stax_stamp.htm 
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Real estate sale, partition and transfer deed – Affix 
tax stamps at 0.1% of the contract price or value of 
the real estate. 
Affixation of Tax Stamps: 
Tax stamps are available in eight denominations of 
$1, $3, $5, $10, $12, $20, $50, and $100 
Exemptions:  
• Marketable securities. 
• Entitlement certificates and licenses, such as 
land ownership deeds, building ownership deeds, 
marriage certificates, individual 
identifications(Personal ID), vehicle registrations, 
drivers license, building license, operation license, 
diplomas, etc., which are outside of stamp tax 
scope, are exempt from stamp tax.  
• Rental contract itself is not within the scope of 
stamp tax. However, if the content of the 
information serve as a consigned process is 
subject to a 0.4% of the rental monetary receipt for 
stamp tax.  
• Sales of real estate, other written contracts on 
real estate property transaction by two concerned 
parties, (private contracts) where no such contract 
will report to tax authorities for filing the land value 
increment tax or land value tax, which fall outside 
of stamp tax scope, are exempt from stamp tax.  
• Contracts or deeds executed by all levels of 
government agencies.  
• Monetary receipts executed by public or private 
school or colleges.  
• Deeds or documents executed by government-
owned or private enterprises internally and not 
involved in rights or obligations with third parties 
• Debit notes sent out for claim of payments or 
audit purposes.  
• Copies or abstracts in which case a tax stamp is 
annexed to the original, with the exception that 
when such copy or abstract is presented in place of 
its original, payment of the stamp tax becomes 
payable. 
• Bus tickets, train tickets, boat tickets, and air fair 
tickets and other tickets for carriage of passengers 
or cargoes.  
• The receipts for sales of self-cultivated 
agricultural products (farmers in the agriculture, 
forestry, fishery and livestock) issued by farmers or 
wholesalers at the first wholesale level on behalf of 
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farmers.  
• Receipts identifying payments of salaries or 
wages.  
• Receipts identifying payments of social benefits, 
alimony or retirement agencies.  
• Receipts of taxes or donations to the government 
issued by collecting agencies.  
• Receipts issued by voluntary handlers of 
government grants at the time of reimbursement. 
• Receipts identifying tax returns.  
• Receipts issued for sales of tax stamps.  
• Receipts of donations issued by corporate 
entities organized for educational, cultural, 
public/social welfare, charitable organizations, or 
benevolent purposes.  
• Receipts issued by the Agricultural Land and 
Water Association to its members for payment of 
irrigation services.  
• Contracts for construction or repair of aircraft, 
ships or boats engaged in transnational navigation. 
• Receipts with product name/description, pricing, 
and quantity issued by small businesses. 
• The uniform invoice issued by businesses 
designated for issuing commercial invoices. 
• Declaration of personal one-time trading 
information that has double receipts use for 
commercial invoice.  
• Receipts from consigned collection by the travel 
industry that has double receipts use for 
commercial invoice.  
• Receipts issued by taxi or cabs that also has 
double receipts use for commercial invoice  
• Sales revenues other than the core business 
collected by the banking, insurance and trust 
management industry. 
Thailand Stamp duty is imposed of documents and 
transactions are subject to stamp duty at various 
rates. Among the more significant instruments 
subject to stamp duty are lease contracts for 
immovable property, share transfers, hire purchase 
contracts, and contracts for the hire of work. 
   
Turkey Stamp tax is levied on gross salary at rate 0.6%   http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cac
he:NHpwc1bRE5UJ:www.tourism.bil
kent.edu.tr/~jamel/Hia/Salary%2520
Accounting%2520in%2520Turkey.do
c+%22stamp+tax%22&hl=en&ie=UT
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F-8 
United 
Kingdom 
Stamp Duty on Shareholders: 
UK stamp duty or, as the case may be, stamp duty 
reserve tax(SDRT) will, subject to certain 
exemptions, be payable on the purchase of Ordinary 
Shares at a rate of 0.5 per cent of the purchase 
price. There is a minimum charge of £5 where a 
stamp duty liability arises.  
5 November 2003 
Budget and the Finance Bill 
2003 contain provisions for a 
new stamp tax to be called 
Stamp Duty Land Tax ("SDLT"). 
This will take effect on 1 
December 2003, but there will 
be important transitional.  The 
proposal for SDLT is a complete 
rewriting of stamp duty law and 
procedure in relation to UK land 
and interests in UK land, but 
this bulletin will focus on: 
mainstream transactions on 
which SDLT will fall more 
heavily than stamp duty did; 
and the transitional provisions 
e.g. for agreements before 1 
December 2003.   Stamp duty is 
a tax on documents. SDLT is to 
be a tax on "transactions" and 
so liability may arise whether or 
not there is a document and 
whether any document is held 
in the UK or elsewhere. Subject 
to limited exemptions, SDLT will 
apply to the acquisition by 
transfer or creation of the 
following chargeable interests: 
an estate, interest (legal or 
equitable), right or power in or 
over land in the UK; and the 
benefit of an obligation, 
restriction or condition affecting 
the value of any such estate, 
interest, right or power.  So 
SDLT will apply to more than 
just freehold and leasehold 
transfers and the creation and 
surrender of leases.  The timing 
of SDLT’s commencement is of 
particular importance for 
transactions which may be 
subject to SDLT but were not 
subject to stamp duty, or where 
the SDLT payable may be more 
12 November 2003 
Joe Churcher and Lesley 
Richardson, Political Staff, PA 
News: 
Changes to stamp duty which will 
see some retail firms’ bills rise by 
up to eight times should be 
scrapped, the Government was 
told today.  Opposition 
spokesman Mark Prisk said 
business had united against the 
proposals, which would hit the 
pub and leisure industry 
particularly hard.  Mr Prisk said 
the supposed aim of making 
stamp duty on leases fairer had 
been abandoned in favor of “the 
one overwhelming and desperate 
need of this Government to 
collect the maximum tax revenue 
to fill the black hole in its 
finances”. “The regulations 
before us represent not as the 
Government said ‘another step 
forward in modernizing stamp 
duty’. It represents instead two 
steps back for business.  “First, it 
is a fourfold tax hike unfair for 
businesses and sectors alike. 
Second, it is a bad tax.  
The Government’s consultation 
had been a “shambles” because 
everyone consulted was against 
what was now proposed. Liberal 
Democrat spokesman David 
Laws said that because the 
measures, first unveiled in April’s 
Budget, would increase duty 
most on longer leases it would 
unfairly hit certain sectors such 
as shops, pubs and restaurants.  
“There must be a concern about 
the unfairness.”  Introducing the 
changes, Treasury Financial 
Secretary Ruth Kelly said 
ministers had listened to 
1)http://www.news.scotsman.com/lat
est.cfm?id=2169829 
2)http://www.thepublican.com/cgi-
bin/item.cgi?id=10259&d=32&h=42&
f=23&dateformat=%25o%20%25B%
20%25Y 
3)http://www.mondaq.com/i_article.a
sp_Q_articleid_E_23211 
4)http://www.thepublican.com/cgi-
bin/item.cgi?id=9054&d= 
32&h=42&f=23&dateformat=%25o%
20%25B%20%25Y 
5)http://www.money.telegraph.co.uk/
money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2003
/10/20/cnruth20.xml&menuId=242&s
Sheet=/money/2003/10/20/ixfrontcity
.html 
6)http://icbirmingham.icnetwork.co.u
k/0150business/0200news/content_o
bjectid=13617181_method=full_sitei
d=50002_headline=-Expand-your-
home-as-market-contracts-
name_page.html 
7) Horsman, E. G., The Avoidance of 
Estate Duty by Gifts Inter Vivos: 
Some Quantitative Evidence”, The 
Economic Journal, September 1975) 
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than would have been payable 
as stamp duty: for example: 
granting of leases - because the 
proposal is for new leases to 
attract SDLT on the premium at 
a rate of up to 4% as before, but 
also on the "net present value" 
of the aggregate of the rents 
over the lease term at a rate of 
1%. This will result in a 
substantial increase in the tax 
payable under SDLT for new 
leases and may encourage 
shorter lease terms and, given 
the obligatory nature of SDLT 
(there is intended to be no 
vestige of the partially 
"voluntary" nature of stamp 
duty) greater focus on whether 
a landlord can grant a licence 
instead of a lease in particular 
cases; exchanges of land – 
under the proposals SDLT 
would be payable on both of the 
properties being exchanged, 
whereas under previous 
practice (if structured correctly) 
stamp duty was payable only on 
the more expensive property.3) 
 
High stamp duty rate rose from 
6 to 9 per cent in December 
2003.4) 
 
Classical research about stamp 
duty: 
The introduction of the capital 
transfer tax, which brings within 
the tax net not only wealth 
transferred at death but also, for 
the first time in Britain, lifetime 
gifts whenever they may be 
made, has served as a fresh 
reminder of the well-known fact 
that for many years the estate 
duty has been avoided on large 
scale.  The value of gifts made 
business on the issue. The new 
regulations would remove 60% of 
all commercial transactions from 
the charge completely. And the 
“vast majority” of residential 
leases would be removed from 
the charge entirely. Further 
reliefs, outlined today, would 
reduce the amount of extra tax 
raised by the measures by £20 
million to £170 million in the first 
year. The Government had 
listened to businesses and 
introduced measures requested 
by the industry to “reduce the 
compliance burden”, she added. 
1) 
 
1 July 2003 
Counter on introducing “the 
stamp duty land tax”: 
The Association of Licensed 
Multiple Retailers (ALMR) has 
criticized government plans to 
reform stamp duty and has 
pledged support for an 
amendment to delay 
implementation of the changes.  
In a survey of its members, the 
ALMR discovered that under the 
new system, the average charge 
would be £10,000, more than a 
tenfold increase compared to the 
current set-up.  Nick Bish, chief 
executive of the ALMR 
(pictured), said: “The 
government’s proposals are 
wrong in principle, flawed in 
practice and will have a 
devastating effect on thousands 
of small businesses. 2) 
 
19 March 2003 
The British Retail Consortium 
(BRC) has slammed the 
government over its plans to 
reform stamp duty claiming it will 
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in the late 1960s upon which 
estate duty was never charged 
amounted to some 330 million 
pound sterling a year; and the 
duty avoided as a result may 
have equaled half of that figure 
or 10% of the net capital value 
of all assessed for duty. 7) 
lead to job losses.  The 
organization, which represents a 
wide-range of retailers, says the 
government proposals could cost 
retailers £1.4bn over the next 
three years.  It is feared the 
plans could burden licensees as 
they would pay stamp duty 
according to the length of the 
lease rather than one year’s 
average rent.  This could result in 
the cost of a lease rising by tens 
of thousands of pounds.4) 
 
20 October 2003 
Trade organizations fear that the 
tax, which will be introduced in 
six weeks' time, will significantly 
limit expansion in some 
industries, as it requires 
businesses to pay an upfront 
sum equivalent to 1pc of the total 
rent payable on the entire life of 
the lease.  Up to now, stamp 
duty has been charged once on 
the average annual rent at a rate 
of between 1pc and 24pc 
depending on the length of the 
lease. Pubs and restaurants will 
be hardest hit because they 
typically take long leases of 
between 20 and 35 years in 
order to amortise the multi-million 
pound cost of fitting out their 
buildings over the duration of the 
lease. The British Retail 
Consortium claims the new tax 
will affect 70pc of retailers and 
lead to three quarters limiting 
their expansion plans. It also 
reckons that 74pc will seek to 
obtain shorter leases. The 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants has labeled the new 
rules "the most significant new 
tax for 30 years".  Trade 
organizations were last week 
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preparing to lambast the 
Government for its limited 
consultation before implementing 
the change.  Mark Prisk, the 
shadow finance secretary to the 
Treasury, said: "It is ill 
considered and half-baked."  The 
increase is partly to help 
compensate the Government for 
the tax revenue lost under its 
policy to abolish stamp duty in 
disadvantaged areas. It 
estimates that by raising the 
amount of stamp duty payable on 
new commercial property leases 
by as much as 10 times, it can 
raise revenues from £190m in 
2004-05 to £210m by 2005-06.   
The proposal will raise the levy 
on individual lease transactions 
by at least 600pc, although the 
Government has said that 
commercial leases with a current 
value of less than £150,000 will 
be exempt, a move it says will 
excuse 60pc of commercial 
leases from the charge. 5) 
 
In response to rumous that the 
Chancellor Gordon Brown is 
planning a new tax grab on 
home-owners, Savills calculates 
that tax raised from residential 
assets in 2002/3 totaled a 
staggering £4.5 billion, and it 
fears further taxation "could have 
negative economic 
consequences".  Since 1997/8, 
says Savills, a combination of 
higher stamp duty and rising 
house prices has produced "a 
great windfall for the Inland 
Revenue", with receipts from 
stamp duty rising four-fold. Sales 
from £60,000 to £250,000 
currently generate the most 
revenue - £1.4billion - while less 
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than a quarter of the total return 
from property comes from the 
highest band above £500,000.6)   
Counter on the increase of stamp 
duty rate: 
The British Beer and Pub 
Association (BBPA) says high 
street watering holes are being 
hit by a 466% tax rise on 
property leases.  The 
government is changing the way 
it calculates stamp duty and will 
use the value of the whole lease 
rather than the average value of 
the rent.  According to BBPA 
figures, the changes will result in 
pubs and bars being charged a 
total of £14.1 million a year, up 
from £3.2 million before - a rise 
of 466%, said the spokesperson. 
US (Florida) Florida has an excise tax called a documentary 
stamp tax on many financial instruments. It was first 
enacted in 1931. 
Documentary stamp tax is levied on documents as 
provided under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes. 
Documents subject to the tax include, but are not 
limited to:  
Deeds 
The tax rate for documents that transfer an interest 
in real property is $.70 per $100 (or portion thereof) 
of the total consideration paid, or to be paid, for the 
transfer. An exception is Miami-Dade County, where 
the rate is $.60 per $100 (or portion thereof) when 
the property is a single-family residence. If the 
Miami-Dade property is anything other than a single-
family residence, the tax rate is $.60 plus $.45 
surtax per $100 (or portion thereof). 
Bonds and Stocks 
Bonds - Documentary stamp tax is due upon the 
original issuance of bonds in this state. The tax rate 
is $.35 per $100 (or portion thereof) based upon the 
face value of the bond. 
Stocks: Effective May 1, 2002, the tax on the 
original issue of stock was repealed. 
Notes and Other Written Obligations to Pay 
Money: 
The tax rate on a written obligation to pay money is 
Merger of Certain Entities and 
Documentary Stamp Tax -- 
§§607.1101 and 607.1101 and 
Chapter 201, F.S. 
Current Situation: 
Sections 607.1101 and 
607.1107, F.S., allow the 
merger of corporations, both 
domestic and foreign. Under 
these types of mergers, title to 
real property owned by the 
merging entity will transfer to 
the surviving entity by operation 
of law, which pursuant to 
§607.1106, F.S., does not 
require recordation of a deed. 
The act of filing the articles of 
merger with Secretary of State 
is sufficient to transfer title to 
real property from the merging 
entity to the surviving entity. If a 
corporation merges with a 
business entity other than a 
corporation, however, a deed 
must be recorded and 
documentary stamp taxes must 
be paid in order to transfer title 
April 2001 
Cons for current system: 
A report by the Center for a 
Competitive Florida:  When 
Florida businesses are involved 
in a large loan -- say $3 million -- 
they have a choice to make. 
They can execute that loan in 
Florida and pay over $10,000 in 
documentary stamp taxes or 
travel to another state like 
Georgia and legally avoid paying 
the tax. Florida TaxWatch has 
heard from Florida businesses 
that routinely execute large loans 
outside of Florida -- particularly in 
Georgia to legally avoid paying 
the tax. This is a purely sound 
business decision where the cost 
of traveling outside the state is 
less than the added tax costs. 
Travel to another state is not 
even necessary. It is also 
common for the parties involved 
to take a boat far enough off the 
Florida coast to be in 
international waters and execute 
1)http://www.myflorida.com/dor/taxes
/doc_stamp.html 
2)http://www.hklaw.com/Publications
/Newsletters.asp?ID=154&Article=72
9 
3)http://www.floridataxwatch.org/arch
ive/doccap.html 
4)http://www.premiergrouprealty.com
/resources/documentarystamptax.as
p 
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$.35 for each $100 (or portion thereof) of the 
obligation evidenced by the document. Tax is due 
on a document that contains a promise to pay a 
specific amount of money and is signed, executed, 
or delivered in Florida. Effective May 1, 2002, the 
maximum amount of documentary stamp tax due on 
unsecured notes or other written obligations is 
$2,450. 
Exemptions: 
Documentary stamp tax is generally payable by any 
of the parties to a taxable transaction. If one party is 
exempt, the tax is required of the nonexempt party. 
United States government agencies; Florida 
government agencies; and Florida's counties, 
municipalities, and political subdivisions are exempt 
from documentary stamp tax. 1) 
Penalty and Interest: 
Any document that, upon audit or when recorded, 
does not contain evidence of the proper amount of 
the tax paid is assessed a penalty of 10 percent of 
the amount of taxed owed per month, not to exceed 
50 percent of the tax not paid. A minimum penalty is 
assessed on late returns, even if no tax is due.4) 
to real property pursuant to the 
merger. In addition, if a limited 
liability company or a limited 
partnerships merge with any 
other business entity 
recordation of deeds and the 
payment of documentary stamp 
taxes are necessary in order to 
transfer title to real property 
pursuant to the mergers. See 
§§607.11101, 608.4383(2), and 
620.204(1)(b), F.S. 
Legislative Change: 
Senate Bill 2190 (SB 2190), 
prefiled 3/7/00, amends the 
above provisions by eliminating 
the requirement that title to real 
property held by corporations, 
limited liability companies, and 
limited partnerships merging 
with other business entities be 
conveyed by recordation of a 
deed. Thus, title to real property 
owned by the merging entity 
would, upon filing of articles of 
merger with the Secretary of 
State, pass by operation of law 
to the surviving entity without 
the requirement of recording a 
deed and paying the applicable 
documentary stamp tax 
required when recording a 
deed. In addition, the Bill also 
amended §608.406, F.S., by 
adding a provision that limited 
liability companies that register 
fictitious names are exempt 
from the provisions of 
608.406(1)(a), F.S., relating to 
the use of “limited liability 
company,” “limited company,” or 
the abbreviations “LLC,” “LC,” 
or “Ltd.” in companies' name. 
the loan there. This too makes 
the transaction free from the 
Florida documentary stamp tax.  
The result is that Florida seldom 
receives any tax revenue from 
these loans and businesses have 
the added cost of travel and 
extra record-keeping.  
Legislation before the 2001 
Florida Legislature would help 
change this situation. House Bill 
1009 and Senate 2140 would 
place a cap on documentary 
stamp taxes on certain 
obligations, removing an 
incentive for individuals and 
businesses to take their financial 
transactions out of Florida. 
Florida tax law should not create 
further incentives for Floridians to 
take business elsewhere.3) 
US (Iowa) 2 June 2003 
Iowa enacted its drug tax in 1990, the state has 
collected nearly $4 million total in penalties and tax 
revenues.1) 
3 June 2003 
Iowa added some new twists 
and are raking in the dough. 
The state issues stamps, which 
In 2002, Iowa took in $1.3 million 
in drug stamp tax penalties and 
revenues. Protestors of the tax 
sound a familiar refrain: "No 
)
1)http://www.cannabisnews.com/new
s/thread16503.shtml 
2)http://www.talkleft.com/archives/00
3324.html 
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vary in cost and color according 
to the drug, to be affixed to the 
drug to show the tax has been 
paid. 
The stamps cost $5 a gram for 
marijuana, $750 per marijuana 
plant, $250 a gram for other 
drugs and $400 per 10 doses of 
drugs that come in tablet form, 
such as ecstasy. The minimum 
charge is $215. 1) 
taxation without legalization." 1) 
US (Kansas) Impose drug tax stamp. The fact that dealing 
marijuana and controlled substances is illegal does 
not exempt it from taxation. Therefore drug dealers 
are required by law to purchase drug tax stamps.  
The stamps are valid for 3 months. Drugs seized 
without stamps or having expired stamps may result 
in criminal or civil penalties which may include fines, 
seizure of property or liens against real estate. 
  http://www.ksrevenue.org/perstaxtyp
esdrug.htm 
US 
(Oklahoma) 
 25 March 2003 
HB1597, currently being 
considered at the State 
Legislature, will increase 
Oklahoma's document stamp 
tax by ten cents per $500 of the 
sales price. Proceeds from this 
tax would be earmarked for a 
new state authority for 
Oklahoma's historical societies. 
new businesses and their 
revenue to our state.1) 
The Oklahoma Association of 
REALTORS® has traditionally 
opposed any efforts to increase 
the documentary stamp tax for 
any purposes. This tax is 
incurred every time a property is 
sold in Oklahoma. While a ten-
cent increase may seem 
insignificant, it will affect the 
affordability of home ownership 
in Oklahoma. As the state 
continues to look for new 
sources of revenue, we must 
protect the affordability of 
homeownership in Oklahoma, a 
benefit that is often touted when 
trying to bring. 1) 
http://www.oklahomarealtors.com/ne
ws/view_article.asp?article=53 
US (Utah) Utah Code -- Title 59 -- Chapter 19 -- Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act 
59-19-102Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
1."Controlled substance" means any drug or 
substance, whether real or counterfeit, as defined in 
Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, 
transported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold 
in violation of Utah laws.  It does not include 
marihuana. 
2.  "Dealer" means a person who, in violation of 
  http://www.le.state.ut.us/~code/TITL
E59/59_13.htm 
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Utah law, manufactures, produces, ships, 
transports, or imports into Utah or in any manner 
acquires or possesses more than 42-1/2 grams of 
marihuana, or seven or more grams of any 
controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units of 
any controlled substance which is not sold by 
weight. 
3. "Marihuana" means any marihuana, whether real 
or counterfeit, as defined in Section 58-37-2, that is 
held, possessed, transported, transferred, sold, or 
offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws. 
59-19-103Tax imposed on marihuana and controlled 
substances. 
1.  A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled 
substances as defined under this chapter at the 
following rates: 
(a)  on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a 
gram, $3.50; 
(b)  on each gram of controlled substance, or each 
portion of a gram, $200; and 
(c)  on each 50 dosage units of a controlled 
substance that is not sold by weight, or portion 
thereof, $2,000. 
2.  For the purpose of calculating the tax under this 
chapter, a quantity of marihuana or other controlled 
substance is measured by the weight of the 
substance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by 
dosage units when the substance is not sold by 
weight, in the dealer's possession.  A quantity of a 
controlled substance is dilute if it consists of a 
detectable quantity of pure controlled substance and 
any excipients or fillers. 
59-19-104Stamps evidencing tax paid to be 
provided and sold by the commission. 
1. The commission shall adopt a uniform system of 
providing, affixing, and displaying official stamps, 
official labels, or other official indicia for marihuana 
and controlled substances on which a tax is 
imposed. 
2. A dealer may not possess any marihuana or 
controlled substance upon which a tax is imposed 
by this chapter, unless the tax has been paid on the 
marihuana or other controlled substance as 
evidenced by a stamp or other official indicia. 
3. Official stamps, labels, or other indicia to be 
affixed to all marihuana or controlled substances 
shall be purchased from the commission. The 
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purchaser shall pay 100% of face value for each 
stamp, label, or other indicia at the time of the 
purchase. 
Vietnam Transfer Taxes  
Vietnamese law provides that it is mandatory to 
register the ownership of certain types of property. 
Registry fees, known in Vietnamese as "le phi truoc 
ba," are imposed on the purchaser of such property 
when it registers the ownership of the property. This 
fee is applicable only to transfers in ownership of 
certain types of property, including buildings and 
houses, vehicles, vessels, and guns.  
Registry fees equal to 2% of the property value must 
be paid on land, buildings, and vessels. The rate is 
4% on vehicles and guns. However, in no case will 
the registry fees for one asset exceed VND 500 
million, which is approximately equal to US $35,714. 
1) 
  1)http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/r
eadingsintaxpolicy.nsf/0/1D537D4C2
06E166685256B820080661F?Open
Document 
Yemen Revenue stamp is levied on the following documents 
and deeds in the following manner:   
a. Contracts as of the time they are signed   
b. Registers as of the time of their being utilized   
c. Correspondence and papers as of the time of 
their being utilized   
d. Proceedings and transactions immediately upon 
being realized   
The revenue stamp tax is of two types: 
a. A proportional revenue stamp tax.   
b. A qualitative revenue stamp tax.    
The price of the qualitative revenue stamp ranges 
between YR 2 and 50 for certificates, extract copies, 
applications, contracts, commercial shipping 
documents, minutes of the meetings of the Boards 
of companies and internal transactions of banks with 
their clients.  The price of the proportional revenue 
stamp tax ranges between 0.1% and 5% on 
insurance, banking and commercial documents, 
amounts disbursed by the government and the 
corporations, advertisements and notices.   A 
qualitative revenue stamp tax is levied on each 
company upon its founding ranging between 
YR1,000 and YR3,000.  A qualitative revenue stamp 
is levied at the rate of YR 3-500 on transport and 
mail services, permits, licenses, subscription to 
telephones, weight certificates, entry in registers and 
auditors' reports. 
  http://www.bisnetworld.net/bisnet/co
untries/yemen11.htm 
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Annex IIA: Stamp Duty Rates for States and Union Territories FY81-FY2003 
 
Basic SC1 Total Basic SC2 Total Basic  SC3 Addl. SC4 Total Basic SC Total Basic SC5 Total Basic SC Total
1980-81 4.5 5 9.5 0 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1981-82 4.5 5 9.5 0 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1982-83 4.5 5 9.5 0 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1983-84 4.5 5 9.5 0 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1984-85 4.5 5 9.5 8.25 8.25 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1985-86 4.5 5 9.5 8.25 8.25 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1986-87 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1987-88 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1988-89 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1989-90 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1990-91 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 3.5 2.8 0.35 6.65 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1991-92 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 4 1 5 12.5 0 12.5
1992-93 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
1993-94 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
1994-95 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
1995-96 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
1996-97 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
1997-98 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
1998-99 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
1999-2000 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 6 1.5 7.5 12.5 0 12.5
2000-01 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 8 2 10 12.5 0 12.5
2001-02 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 8 2 10 12.5 0 12.5
2002-03 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 8 2 10 12.5 0 12.5
2003-04 5 5 10 8.25 8.25 7 2.8 0.35 10.15 8 0 8 8 2 10 12.5 0 12.5
Year Gujarat HaryanaAndhra Pradesh Assam Bihar & Jharkhand Goa, Daman & Diu
2.  For surcharge See Section 301 (1) of Assam Muncipal Act, 1958 and                                      
1.  The surcharge levied on theamount or value of the consideration for the sale or market value of the property, whichever is higher.
3.  The rate of surcharge is 85 paise per Re. 1 of stamp duty since 19.1.1972.
4.  The rate of additional surcharge is 10% of the amount of stamp duties since 1.12.1977.
5.  Additional stamp duty is leviable under Section 3-A of the Bombay Stamp Act (Gujarat), 1958, @ 25% of stamp duty.
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Annex IIB: Stamp Duty Rates for States and Union Territories FY81-FY2003 
 
Basic SC Total Basic SC Total Basic SC6 Total Basic SC Total Basic SC Total Basic SC Total
1980-81 8 0 8 2 2 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1981-82 8 0 8 2 2 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1982-83 8 0 8 2 2 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1983-84 8 0 8 2 2 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1984-85 8 0 8 2 2 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1985-86 8 0 8 2 2 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1986-87 8 0 8 2 2 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1987-88 8 0 8 10 2 12 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 0
1988-89 8 0 8 10 2 12 7.5 5 12.5 2 2 10 0 10
1989-90 8 0 8 10 2 12 7.5 5 12.5 7.5 4 11.5 10 0 10 7 0 7
1990-91 8 0 8 10 2 12 7.5 5 12.5 7.5 4 11.5 10 0 10 7 0 7
1991-92 8 0 8 10 2 12 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 10 0 10 7 0 7
1992-93 8 0 8 10 2 12 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 10 0 10 7 0 7
1993-94 8 0 8 10 2 12 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 10 0 10 7 0 7
1994-95 8 0 8 6 2 8 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 10 0 10 7 0 7
1995-96 8 0 8 6 2 8 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
1996-97 8 0 8 6 2 8 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
1997-98 8 0 8 8 2 10 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
1998-99 8 0 8 8 2 10 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
1999-2000 8 0 8 8 2 10 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
2000-01 8 0 8 8 2 10 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
2001-02 8 0 8 8 2 10 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
2002-03 8 0 8 8 2 10 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
2003-04 8 0 8 8 2 10 8.5 5 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 8 0 8 7 0 7
Year Kerala
Madhya Pradesh and 
Chattisgarh Maharashtra ManipurHimachal Pradesh Karnataka
6.  The surcharge of 4% in muncipal area and 5% in corporation of the consideration is levied separately.
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Annex IIC: Stamp Duty Rates for States and Union Territories FY81-FY2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic SC Total Basic SC Total Basic SC7 Total Basic SC Total Basic SC Total Basic SC Total
1980-81 9 9 10 0 10 17 0 17 6 5 11
1981-82 6.6 0 6.6 9 9 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1982-83 6.6 0 6.6 9 9 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1983-84 6.6 0 6.6 9 9 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1984-85 6.6 0 6.6 9 9 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1985-86 6.6 0 6.6 10.5 10.5 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1986-87 6.6 0 6.6 10.5 10.5 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1987-88 6.6 0 6.6 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1988-89 6.6 0 6.6 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.5 0 12.5 17 0 17 6 5 11
1989-90 6.6 0 6.6 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.5 0 12.5 0 0 6 5 11
1990-91 6.6 0 6.6 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.5 0 12.5 0 0 6 5 11
1991-92 6.6 0 6.6 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.5 0 12.5 0 0 6 5 11
1992-93 6.6 0 6.6 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.5 0 12.5 10 0 10 6 5 11
1993-94 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.5 0 12.5 10 0 10 6 5 11
1994-95 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 12.6 0 12.6 10 0 10 6 5 11
1995-96 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 10 0 10 6 5 11
1996-97 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 10 0 10 6 5 11
1997-98 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 10 0 10 6 5 11
1998-99 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 10 0 10 6 5 11
1999-2000 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 10 0 10 6 5 11
2000-01 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 10 0 10 8 5 13
2001-02 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 11 0 11 8 5 13
2002-03 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 11 0 11 8 5 13
2003-04 9.9 0 9.9 4.2 10.5 14.7 6 0 6 11 0 11 8 5 13
NagalandMeghalayaYear TamilnaduRajasthanPunjabOrissa
7.  These rates of additional stamp duty are for property situated in urban areas.  The rates of additional stamp duty situated in rural areas was 6.5% till 
1984-85 and 6% thereafter.
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Annex IID: Stamp Duty Rates for States and Union Territories FY81-FY2003 
Basic SC Total Basic SC Total Basic SC Addl. SC Total Basic SC Total
1980-81 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1981-82 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1982-83 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1983-84 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1984-85 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1985-86 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1986-87 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1987-88 5 0 5 2 2 0 2 2 3 5 8
1988-89 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 16 3.2 2 21.2 3 5 8
1989-90 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 16 3.2 2 21.2 3 5 8
1990-91 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 16 3.2 2 21.2 3 5 8
1991-92 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 16 3.2 2 21.2 3 5 8
1992-93 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 16 3.2 2 21.2 3 5 8
1993-94 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 16 3.2 2 21.2 3 5 8
1994-95 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 10 2 2 14 3 5 8
1995-96 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 10 2 2 14 3 5 8
1996-97 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 5 1 2 8 3 5 8
1997-98 5 0 5 12.5 2 14.5 5 1 2 8 3 5 8
1998-99 5 0 5 8 2 10 5 1 2 8 3 5 8
1999-2000 5 0 5 8 2 10 5 1 2 8 3 5 8
2000-01 5 0 5 8 2 10 5 1 2 8 3 5 8
2001-02 5 0 5 8 2 10 5 1 2 8 8 5 13
2002-03 5 0 5 8 2 10 5 1 2 8 8 5 13
2003-04 5 0 5 8 2 10 5 1 2 8 5 3 8
Year Union Territory of DelhiWest BengalUttar PradeshTripura
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Annex III: Time Series Analysis of Stamp Duty Revenues in West Bengal 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.9964515
R Square 0.9929156 West Bengal 
Adjusted R Square 0.9872481 Data 2
Standard Error 991.67537
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 689156219.9 1.72E+08 175.1938 1.471E-05
Residual 5 4917100.241 983420
Total 9 694073320.1
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -8285.0999 8777.323293 -0.943921 0.388551 -30847.891 14277.69103 -30847.891 14277.691
Property Index Res -19.976976 17.08005021 -1.169609 0.294874 -63.882571 23.92861916 -63.882571 23.9286192
Total Tax Rate 1543.8517 618.6364365 2.495572 0.054786 -46.401261 3134.104715 -46.401261 3134.10472
Total Tax Rate ^2 -76.856187 20.25882888 -3.793713 0.01271 -128.93308 -24.779295 -128.93308 -24.779295
Real State GDP/Capita 45.973996 5.980697228 7.687063 0.000594 30.6001491 61.34784221 30.6001491 61.3478422
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Annex IV. Actual vs. Predicted Growth of Stamp Tax Revenues 
 
 
State Year taxrevgrow predictedrevgrowth stamprategrow1 propgrowth real gdp growth
Maharashtra 1992-93 34.25 46.35487855 0.00 32.03 14.32
Maharashtra 1993-94 27.82 64.61919039 0.00 53.74 10.88
Maharashtra 1994-95 84.04 43.29254265 0.00 40.74 2.55
Maharashtra 1995-96 11.01 6.991747913 -20.00 15.50 11.49
Maharashtra 1996-97 -2.49 -6.942183433 0.00 -12.02 5.08
Maharashtra 1997-98 36.32 -13.99020079 0.00 -18.55 4.56
Maharashtra 1998-99 -13.07 -9.692392519 0.00 -13.41 3.72
Maharashtra 1999-00 18.75 4.839276743 0.00 -4.42 9.26
Maharashtra 2000-01 26.78 -4.998910389 0.00 -1.63 -3.37
State Year taxrevgrow predictedrevgrowth stamprategrow1 propgrowth real gdp growth
Tamil Nadu 1992-93 6.80 31.55387023 0.00 26.21 5.34
Tamil Nadu 1993-94 21.50 60.18345962 0.00 51.54 8.64
Tamil Nadu 1994-95 33.06 42.50866834 0.00 29.95 12.56
Tamil Nadu 1995-96 24.54 13.22 0.00 9.77 3.45
Tamil Nadu 1996-97 -4.50 -10.69622645 0.00 -15.66 4.96
Tamil Nadu 1997-98 6.94 0.227245972 0.00 -7.59 7.82
Tamil Nadu 1998-99 6.47 -3.917508658 0.00 -9.13 5.21
Tamil Nadu 1999-00 19.13 9.327190127 0.00 3.52 5.81
Tamil Nadu 2000-01 8.43 29.414236 18.18 3.88 7.35
State Year taxrevgrow predictedrevgrowth stamprategrow1 propgrowth real gdp growth
West Bengal 1992-93 -8.33 22.45465134 0.00 19.28 3.18
West Bengal 1993-94 8.69 32.28322768 0.00 24.95 7.33
West Bengal 1994-95 85.74 -8.321076475 -33.96 18.84 6.81
West Bengal 1995-96 10.26 40.06635265 0.00 32.65 7.41
West Bengal 1996-97 10.23 -28.19416695 -42.86 7.69 6.97
West Bengal 1997-98 4.63 13.01233836 0.00 4.76 8.25
West Bengal 1998-99 9.43 -0.461456444 0.00 -6.82 6.36
West Bengal 1999-00 15.26 6.880460354 0.00 0.00 6.88
West Bengal 2000-01 2.73 1.468065258 0.00 -4.88 6.35
State Year taxrevgrowth predictedgrowth stamprategrowth propvalgrowth real gdp growth
Delhi* 1992-93 6.37 15.39 0.00 10.27 5.12
Delhi* 1993-94 37.65 24.53 0.00 18.63 5.90
Delhi* 1994-95 55.05 59.32 0.00 52.07 7.25
Delhi* 1995-96 27.32 35.60 0.00 28.26 7.34
Delhi* 1996-97 -9.74 9.11 0.00 1.27 7.84
Delhi* 1997-98 2.09 -8.39 0.00 -13.18 4.79
Delhi* 1998-99 15.29 -3.37 0.00 -9.88 6.51
Delhi* 1999-00 42.18 1.25 0.00 -4.81 6.06
Delhi* 2000-01 1.76 4.37 0.00 0.00 4.37
Delhi* 2001-02 49.29 67.15 62.50 -1.12 5.78
*no data available for gdp in Delhi so number used here is for India as a whole
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Annex V: Stamp Tax Revenue Data Across States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a: Annual Percentage Change 
in Stamp Duty Revenues and Rates 
Figure 2b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
Delhi 
Delhi
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
198
0-8
1
198
5-8
6
199
0-9
1
199
5-9
6
200
0-0
1
Year
A
nn
ua
l %
 C
ha
ng
e
Tax Rev Stamp Rate
Delhi
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
Year
R
s.
  L
ak
hs
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
R
at
e 
(%
)
Tax Revenue Stamp Rate
Andhra Pradesh
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
198
0-8
1
198
5-8
6
199
0-9
1
199
5-9
6
200
0-0
1
Year
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
an
nu
al
ly
Tax Revenue Stamp Tax Rate
Andhra Pradesh 
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Figure 1a: Annual Percentage Change 
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Figure 3a: Annual Percentage Change 
in Stamp Duty Revenues and Rates 
Figure 3b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
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Figure 6a: Annual Percentage Change 
in Stamp Duty Revenues and Rates 
Figure 6b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
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Figure 5b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
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Figure 7a: Annual Percentage Change 
in Stamp Duty Revenues and Rates 
Figure 7b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
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Figure 8a: Annual Percentage Change 
in Stamp Duty Revenues and Rates 
Figure 8b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
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Figure 10a: Annual Percentage Change 
in Stamp Duty Revenues and Rates 
Figure 10b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
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Figure 9b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
Figure 9a: Annual Percentage Change 
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Figure 11a: Annual Percentage Change 
In Stamp Duty Revenues and Rates 
Figure 11b: Stamp Duty Revenues 
and Rates 
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Figure 12: Pooled Instances of Rate Changes against Revenue Change (All Above States) 
All State Pooled
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Figure 14a: 
Maharashtra 
Figure 14b: 
Maharashtra
Predicted Revenue Growth 
vs. Actual Revenue Growth and Stamp Tax 
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Figure 13a: Figure 13b: 
Delhi
Predicted Revenue Growth 
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Figure 15a: Figure 15b: 
Tamil Nadu
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Figure 16a: 
West Bengal 
Figure 16b: 
West Bengal
Predicted Revenue Growth vs.
Actual Revenue Growth and Stamp Tax 
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